EMORY UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Economics 487
Game Theory
Spring 2011
Tilman Klumpp (tklumpp AT emory DOT edu)
Announcements: The
final exam will not be cumulative.
Material from the second half of the course will be covered (Units 3,
4), with an emphasis on the material from repeated games and later.
Tests:
Slides:
Chapter 3 (Representation of games)
Chapter 4 (Dominance solvable games)
Chapter 5 (Nash Equilibrium in two-player games)
Chapter 6-a (Mixed strategies)
Chapter 6-b (Mixed strategies)
Chapter 6-c (Mixed strategies)
Chapter 8-a (Games with many players)
Chatper 8-b (Games with many players)
Chapter 9 (Equilibrium selection)
Chapter 10 (Market games in normal form)
Chapter 11 (Contest games)
Chapter 12 (Backward induction and credibility)
Chapter 13 (Commitment)
Chapter 14 (Subgame perfection)
Chapter 16 (Finitely repeated games)
Chapter 17 (Infinitely repeated games)
Chapter 18 (Bargaining)
Chapter 19 (Bayesian games)
Chapter 20 (Beliefs and Bayes’ rule)
Chapter 21 (Signaling games)
Chapter 22 (Auctions and competitive bidding)
Answer to Exercises:
Chapter 3 (handwritten)
Chapter 4 (handwritten)
Chapter 5 (handwritten)
(I don’t have answers written up for 12, 13 but some of it we did in class.)