Robert N. McCauley
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| 1 |
Explanatory Pluralism and the Co-evolution of Theories in Science
Robert N. McCauley |
17 |
| 2 |
From Neurophilosophy to Neurocomputation: Searching for the Cognitive Forest
Patricia Kitcher |
48 |
| 3 |
Dealing in Futures: Folk Psychology and the Role of Representations in Cognitive Science
Andy Clark |
86 |
| 4 |
Paul Churchland’s PDP Approach to Explanation
William G. Lycan
|
104 |
| 5 |
What Should a Connectionist Philosophy of Science
Look Like?
William Bechtel
|
121 |
| 6 |
Paul Churchland and State Space Semantics
Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore
|
145 |
| |
Reply to Churchland
Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore
|
159 |
| 7 |
Images and Subjectivity: Neurobiological Trials
and Tribulations
William G. Lycan
|
163 |
| 8 |
The Furniture of Mind: A Yard of Hope, a Ton of
Terror?
John Marshall and Jennifer Gurd
|
176 |
| 9 |
The Moral Network
Owen Flanagan
|
192 |
A—The Future of Psychology, Folk
and Scientific
|
219 |
| 10 |
McCauley’s Demand for a Co-level Competitor
|
222 |
| 11 |
Connectionism as Psychology
|
232 |
| 12 |
Kitcher’s Empirical Challenge: Has There
Been Progress in Neurophilosophy?
|
239 |
| 13 |
Clark’s Connectionist Defense of Folk Psychology
|
250 |
B—The
Impact of Neural Network Models on the Philosophy of Science
|
256 |
| 14 |
On the Nature of Explanation: William Lycan
|
257 |
| 15 |
Bechtel on the Proper Form of a Connectionist
Philosophy of Science
|
265 |
| C—Semantics in a New Vein |
271 |
| 16 |
Fodor and Lepore: State-Space Semantics and Meaning
Holism
|
272 |
| 17 |
Second Reply to Fodor and Lepore
|
274 |
| D—Consciousness and Methodology |
284 |
| 18 |
Neuropsychology and Brain Organization: The Damasios
|
285 |
| 19 |
Conceptual Analysis and Neuropsychology: John
Marshall and Jennifer Gurd
|
290 |
| 20 |
Do We Propose to Eliminate Consciousness?
|
297 |
| E—Moral Psychology and the
Rebirth of Moral Theory |
301 |
| 21 |
Flanagan on Moral Knowledge
|
302 |