I wanted to correct and compare my translation with other published translations, as this is one of the types of activities I'd like to be able to do with German philosophical translations (understand some of the different interpretations of a text). For my Human, All Too Human translation I picked up two translations to compare against, one by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, 1986), and another by Gary Handwerk (Stanford, 1995). The texts below are color coded as follows:
Original Bold Black
Mine Blue
Hollingdale Green
Handwerk Violet
My notes Italicized Red
If there is no disagreement among the versions, then I've left it in blue.
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Menschliches, Allzumenschliches
Human, All too Human
Human, All too Human
Human, All Too Human, I
Ein Buch für freie Geister
A Book for Free Spirits
Friedrich Nietzsche
Erstes Hauptstück.
First Section.
Volume One.
Von den ersten und letzten Dingen.
Of First and Last Things.
1. Chemie der Begriffe und Empfindungen.
The Chemistry of Concepts and Feelings.
1. The Chemistry of concepts and sensations.
1. The Chemistry of concepts and sensations.
Die Philosophischen Probleme nehmen jetzt wieder fast in allen Stücken dieselbe Form der Frage an, wie vor zweitausend Jahren. - wie kann Etwas aus seinem Gegensatz entstehen, zum Beispiel Vernünftiges aus Vernunftlosem, Empfindendes aus Todtem, Logik aus Unlogik, interesseloses Anschauen aus begehrlichem Wollen, Leben für Andere aus Egoismus, Wahrheit aus Irrthümern?
In the past two thousand years, almost all philosophical problems took up the same form of question - How can something develop out of its opposite, for example rationality from irrationality, vitality from death, logic from illogic, dispassionate experience from insatiable will, altruism from egotism, truth from error?
Almost all the problems of philosophy once again pose the same form of question as they did two thousand years ago: how can something originate in its opposite, for example rationality in irrationality, the sentient in the dead, logic in unlogic, disinterested contemplation in covetous desire, living for others in egoism, truth in error?
At almost every point, philosophical problems are once again assuming the same form for their questions as they did two thousand years ago: how can something arise from its opposite, for example something rational from something irrational, something sentient from something dead, logic from illogic, disinterested contemplation from willful desire, living for others from egoism, truth from error?
(Notes: Okay, I misunderstood the opening structure, didn't get the "once again" component. But I think I did well on the oppositions - I actually like mine better than the published ones in some cases.)
Die metaphysische Philosophie half sich bisher über diese Schwierigkeit hinweg, insofern sie die Entstehung des Einen aus dem Andern leugnete und für die höher gewertheten Dinge einen Wunder-Ursprung annahm, unmittelbar aus dem Kern und Wesen des "Dinges an sich" heraus.
Metaphysical philosophy has so far helped to ignore these difficulties, to the extent that the origin of one from the other is denied, and a miraculous origin is believed in, which occurs spontaneously from the seed and nature of "things as such."
Metaphysical philosophy has hirtherto surmounted this difficulty by denying that the one originates in the other and assuming for the more highly valued thing a miraculous source in the very kernel and being of the 'thing in itself'.
Metaphysical philosophy has up to now helped itself get past this difficulty by denying that one emerged from the other and assuming that more highly valued things had a miraculous origin, immediately out of the core and essence of the "thing in itself."
(Notes: I didn't catch the self-reflexive aspect of "help" in the first part, and couldn't quite figure out the höher gewertheten Dinge bit about highly valued things. But I got a big part of the gist of the passage, which makes me feel a little better.)
Die historische Philosophie dagegen, welche gar nicht mehr getrennt von der Naturwissenschaft zu denken ist, die allerjüngste aller philosophischen Methoden, ermittelte in einzelnen Fällen (und vermuthlich wird diess in allen ihr Ergebniss sein), dass es keine Gegensätze sind, ausser in der gewohnten Übertreibung der populären oder metaphysischen Auffassung und dass ein Irrthum der Vernunft dieser Gegenüberstellung zu Grunde liegt: nach ihrer Erklärung giebt es, streng gefasst, weder ein unegoistisches Handeln, noch ein völlig interesseloses Anschauen, es sind beides nur Sublimirungen, bei denen das Grundelement fast verflüchtigt erscheint und nur noch für die feinste Beobachtung sich als vorhanden erweist.
Historical philosophy's opposition (which is not much different from the thought of the natural sciences, the youngest of all philosophical methods) discovered in individual cases (and will probably always have this result ), that opposites don't exist, (except in the usual popular exaggeration or metaphysical view) and that in these oppositional stances lie an error of basic rationality: after the Enlightenment provided (strictly speaking) neither an altruistic exchange nor a fully disinterested experience, both are only imaginary, by this the basic element was just cursed appearance and not proved to exist by the finest observation.
Historical philosophy, on the other hand, which can no longer be separated from natural science, the youngest of all philosophical methods, has discovered in individual cases (and this will probably be the result in every case) that there are no opposites, except in the cuustomary exaggeration of popular metaphysical interpretations, and that a mistake in reasoning lies at the bottom of this antithesis: according to this explanation there exists, strictly speaking, neither an unegoistic action nor completely disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations, in which the basic element seems almost to have dispersed and reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation.
Historical philosophy, by contrast, which can no longer be thought of as separate from natural science, the youngest of all philosophical methods, has ascertained in individual cases (and this will presumably be its result in every case) that there are no opposites, except in the habitual exaggeration of popular or metaphysical views, and that an error in reasoning lies at the base of such oppositions: according to its explanation, there are, strictly speaking, neither any unegoistical actions nor any completely disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations, in which the fundamental element appears to have almost evaporated and reveals its presence only to the keenest observation.
(Notes: I got into trouble in the latter half of the sentence when I mistook Erklärung for Aufklärung (the Enlightenment), and it went downhill from there. I also couldn't find Sublimirungen in the dictionary, and should have trusted my first impulse that it was something to do with sublimation. I'm still a bit confused about how fast verflüchtigt erscheint can mean either "dispersed" or "evaporated".)
Alles, was wir brauchen und was erst bei der gegenwärtigen Höhe der einzelnen Wissenschaften uns gegeben werden kann, ist eine Chemie der moralischen, religiösen, ästhetischen Vorstellungen und Empfindungen, ebenso aller jener Regungen, welche wir im Gross- und Kleinverkehr der Cultur und Gesellschaft, ja in der Einsamkeit an uns erleben: wie, wenn diese Chemie mit dem Ergebniss abschlösse, dass auch auf diesem Gebiete die herrlichsten Farben aus niedrigen, ja verachteten Stoffen gewonnen sind?
For all this, what we need and what first our opposition could become by the current pinacle of the individual sciences, is a chemistry of morals, religions, aesthetic positions and feelings, from all those stirrings, which we find in great and small dealings in culture and society, and of course in the loneliness of our experience: how, when this chemistry would conclude with the result that on these regions have been won both the most magnificent colors from nothing, and despised materials as well?
All we require, and what can be given us only now the individual sciences have attained their present level, is a chemistry of the moral, religious and aesthetic conceptions and sensations, likewise of all the agitations we experience within ourselves in cultural and social intercourse, and indeed even when we are alone: what if this chemistry would end up by revealing that in this domain too the most glorious colors are derived from base, indeed from despised materials?
All that we need, and what can be given to us only now, at the present level of the individual sciences, is a chemistry of the moral, religious, aesthetic representations and sensations, likewise of all those stimuli that we experience within ourselves amid the wholesale and retail transactions of culture and society, indeed even in solitude: what if this chemistry were to reach the conclusion that in this area, too, the most magnificent colors have been extracted from base, even despised materials?
(Notes: I wasn't far off here, just missed some of the more subtle connections in the flow of the sentence, so mine ends up reading pretty clumsily. I got a little uncertain of the precise relationships in the final clause, too.)
Werden Viele Lust haben, solchen Untersuchungen zu folgen?
Have we much desire to conclude so much examination?
Will there be many who desire to pursue such researches?
Will many people have the desire to pursue such investigations?
(Notes: I blew it here; he used some contracted forms that confused me. My translaton got a literal sense of the words and missed the main point.)
Die Menschheit liebt es, die Fragen über Herkunft und Anfänge sich aus dem Sinn zu schlagen: muss man nicht fast entmenscht sein, um den entgegengesetzten Hang in sich zu spüren?
Mankind loves it, to struggle with the questions of origin and beginnings of sense: must not man be almost unmanned, in order to sense in himself the tendency of oppositions?
Mankind likes to put questions of origins and beginnings out of its mind: must one not be almost inhuman to detect in oneself a contrary inclination?
Humanity loves to put from its mind questions concerning origins and beginnings: wouldn't we have to be almost dehumanized to find in ourselves traces of the opposite inclination?
(Notes: I blew it again, lost the rejecting connotation in the first part. Also didn't quite get the concluding point either.)
(Concluding notes: I think I did better in some places than I thought I was going to do, and worse in some other places. Overall, I'm pleased with my first effort at translating Nietzsche, I generally understood a lot of it, and I was afraid it would be completely incomprehensible. I am also pleased that I come away from the passage with a much better understanding of the nuances of Nietzsche's prose, which is exactly my goal overall. I don't know if I'll go to this much trouble in the future to compare transalations, but it was helpful here to see how on track I was.)