The term Postmodernism is currently used by many academic and artistic disciplines, and represents a major intellectual movement that came into being in the United States in the 1960s and was then adopted in Europe in the 1970s. [Sarup, p.131] Jean François Lyotard has been a central figure of this movement, and his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge has been called the bible of Postmodernism. [Sim, p.30] The book describes a crisis in legitimation of knowledge which has occurred in the second half of the 20th century, an era that he terms Postmodern. Lyotard introduces two keys terms in the course of the book: performativity and paralogy. These two terms are integral to his analysis of the needs of a just society for a new method of legitimation in the Postmodern period. These two key terms will be explained by first summarizing the central arguments of The Postmodern Condition, and then dealing more specifically with what Lyotard means by performativity and paralogy.

The Postmodern Condition was a report commissioned by the Conseil des Universités of the Quebec government. It analyzes the status of knowledge in postindustrial, information-economy based societies such as the United States and Europe, with special attention to research and education. He begins by observing that society in the Modern age (a period contrasted by many writers with Antiquity and beginning perhaps as early as the Renaissance but at least with the Enlightenment) has legitimated knowledge in terms of "metanarratives". [Sarup, p.130] A metanarrative (the term "grand" narrative is used interchangeably) is a narrative about narratives, a prescriptive context which adjudges between courses of action in terms of a narrative account of ultimate ends. Society has embraced various metanarratives in different times and places. Grand narratives are typically some philosophical form of the Enlightenment narrative of the emancipation of man, such as Marxism, which provide a total account of political and economic prescriptive contexts. Lyotard characterizes the 20th century, particularly the period after World War II, as fundamentally different in the respect of society's incredulity toward metanarratives. The great "-isms" have all been discredited, and no longer hold the power to legitimate knowledge. Lyotard calls this period "Postmodern" because it rejects all the metanarratives that delineated the Modern age, in fact, rejecting the very concept of metanarrative as a way of legitimating knowledge. What legitimates knowledge in the Postmodern age in the absence of metanarratives is the focus of his book.

Lyotard notes that in pragmatic terms the 20th century has been dominated by scientific advances in dealing with language: telecommunication technologies, automation, computers, and information processing and storage systems. These advances have transformed knowledge into a commodity, in fact, the central commodity of strategic importance to society. The mercantilization of knowledge has had such pervasive effects on society that it has changed many of the game rules for our institutions of government, global markets, science, literature, and the arts. The pervasive influence of cybernetic technologies, what Lyotard terms the "computerization of society" [Lyotard 1984, p. 7] is what structures much of his subsequent comments about what he terms performativity and the pragmatic criteria of judgement of knowledge and action in society.

Lyotard next recounts Wittgenstein's concept of "language games," which describes various kinds of communication acts in terms of systems of rules. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language avoids commitment of grand statements of philosophical truth, and instead portrays discourse as various particular language games in which various "moves" are allowed as various kinds of moves are allowed in actual games like chess. Lyotard believes that whereas the social bond was based on metanarratives in the Modern age, the social bond is based on particularized language game settings in the Postmodern age. Therefore, there are rules of acceptable behavior one follows in various social settings, rigid hierarchical relationships in some settings like the military and looser (but still rule-bound) communication relationship in other social gatherings. These particular language games do not constitute grand narratives, but "little" narratives, which legitimate knowledge and actions in settings much smaller than society as a whole. In this model, individuals interact in the context of interrelated flexible networks of language games. This interaction is characterized at a fundamental level by "agonistics", struggles between differing outlooks in language games. A key kind of move which interests Lyotard in language games is the "innovation", the imaginative idea, the observation of a paradoxical new feature observed within the context of a little narrative. These paradoxes and innovations are important to his later development of the concept of paralogy.

The orientation of the book to research and education leads Lyotard to describe the details of how metanarratives have been rejected in the university context. He explores the two major Western models for the university system, the German model developed by Wilhelm von Humbolt, and the French model developed under Napoleon. He characterizes the former as "philosophical", and the latter as "political". The German model arose from Humbolt's recommendations in the founding of the University of Berlin at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It articulated features that were later adopted by universities in the United States: what we now consider the traditional model of a liberal education which builds the moral character of the student in service of their country, and acknowledges the independence of scientific research from intellectual constraints. These two parallel elements form a fundamental antagonism for Lyotard, who emphasizes that Humbolt admits that the State is not interested in learning but "character and action." This conflict between the pragmatic interests of the polity and the narrative of the spirit of pure speculative research are what ultimately dooms this model. Lyotard describes the ultimate disastrous articulation of this model by Heidegger in the speech he gave in 1933 when assuming the rectorship of the university of Freiburg-in-Breisgau, which incorporated much of the Nazi political agenda of racism and nationalism. The French model of higher education, organized in a highly centralized and explicitly political structure with the goal of producing the administrative and professional skills needed for the stability of the State, is an equally incredulous metanarrative for the university. The Napoleonic model assumes that education serves the political will of the people, since the government is created by the people to express and exert their will. This outlook is either supremely naïve or supremely cynical, depending on the degree to which one acknowledges the limitations of representative government. The ultimate skepticism toward this model arises in response to the educational system created in the Stalin-era Soviet Union, which corrupted the goals of learning to those of indoctrination and political hegemony. This sketch of the failure of educational metanarratives to date prepares the way for his next topic, the ways in which scientific research is undertaken in the absence of prescriptive metanarratives.

The differences in legitimation criteria between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge are taken up next by Lyotard. Because of the completely different criteria which "count" in legitimizing scientific and narrative knowledge, it is impossible to judge the validity of science in terms of narrative, and vice versa. [Lyotard 1984, p.26] Although science resorts to narrative to communicate with society at large, its legitimation is based on pragmatic criteria internal to science rather than a transcendental narrative authority. [[Lyotard 1984, p.29] This raises a curious question, however. If the pursuit of scientific knowledge is not prescribed by a grand narrative, why undertake it? The answer leads Lyotard to the development of his concept of performativity.

Scientific and technological research are validated by pragmatic rather than prescriptively narrative concerns. In the absence of grand narratives, the pragmatic criteria of the pursuit of economic wealth and political power structure the choices made in society within language games. [Lyotard 1984, p.44-47] Amassing scientific knowledge leads to additional wealth through product innovation, which leads to additional investment in commercially funded research. This is the central feedback loop of the modern cybernetic system that composes the pragmatic features of our society. The core pragmatic question is how to optimize the performance of the system in terms of minimizing inputs and maximizing outputs. This drive to optimize the system is what Lyotard terms "performativity." The sense of Lyotard's performativity builds upon John Austin's well-known usage of the term in linguistic philosophy [see discussion in Lee], but combines it with the systems and communications philosophy of Niklas Luhmann. [Luhmann, 1982] Performativity represents a way to make decisions in the absence of metanarratives, but it is fundamentally a decision-making methodology that does not care about the welfare of human beings in society as a whole, and thus rejects any notion of justice. As an unjust, dehumanizing principle, it cannot represent the just, legitimizing principle for the Postmodern age that Lyotard is seeking. In seeking optimum performance of a cybernetic system, it ignores the needs of members of society to live together. "For nothing proves that optimal performance defines the best mode of coexistence or even contributes to it." [Lyotard 1993, p.5] Performativity is, however, the default criterion of selection which pragmatically operates in fact on society in the Postmodern age currently. Lyotard at times expresses a grudging ambivalence toward performativity, granting it "a persuasive force" and saying that "The performativity principle has its 'advantages.'" [Lyotard 1984, p.62] Lyotard goes on to analyze the probable effects of performativity on research and education. This analysis occupies two chapters of the book and are important to review to fully understand the flavor of Lyotard's notion of performativity.

Lyotard reminds us that claims of truth and claims of justice are inextricably interwoven. In its special claims to truth, science inextricably involves itself in political questions of justice. Politics adjudges and allocates resources for endeavors undertaken by elements of society, and the Postmodern relationship of scientific knowledge and the State therefore assumes a special dynamic. The requirements of 20th century scientific research, with all of its required technical equipment of investigation, is tremendously expensive. However, the major investment involved in this research is required for the particular claims to proof internal to science. As Lyotard pointedly says, "No money, no proof." [Lyotard 1984, p.45] Thus, science is legitimated by its degree of performativity, and in some sense suborned by it, because research which fails to perform is subject to termination in funding and thereby exterminated, what Lyotard aptly calls "the realm of terror". [Lyotard 1984, p.46]

Education is likewise subordinated to the goal of performativity. Lyotard identifies a litany of changes in education which are likely to occur because they will in his opinion lead to more efficient educational results. Some examples include increased emphasis on the following: adult continuing education, reform of curricula toward fields in demand in the marketplace, interdisciplinary studies, and above all, far greater use of computer technology in all aspects of the educational process. At the end of this extensive set of recommendations for education, Lyotard finally goes on to develop his notion of a legitimation criterion which (unlike performativity) incorporates respect for individuals but at the same time will operate in accord with the pragmatic considerations of performativity. This is what he terms paralogy.

Lyotard reviews a variety of non-traditional scientific areas which have proved fruitful in recent years, including chaos theory, fractal mathematics, and quantum mechanics. The key feature of these areas of research which Lyotard believes provides their special strength is that, unlike the incremental and theory-bound work of most areas of the sciences, they actively and imaginatively seek out instabilities and anomalies in current theories. This search for anomalies and paradoxes echoes the type of move that Lyotard previously identified as compelling in language games generally, and he seizes on the concept to form the basis of his legitimation grail. Since the most effective (performative) strategy for achieving advances in both scientifically based and narratively based fields of research is the search for imaginative new insights into existing theories by noting anomalies and paradoxes, he coins a neologistic term: paralogy. Paralogy here does not have the dictionary meaning of "false reasoning", but captures the elements of this individualistic search for new meaning in old language games. Lyotard identifies an important technical requirement for this new legitimation strategy to be effective, namely that the major data banks of information currently hoarded must be freely available in order to create a level playing field for research-oriented language games. This move is in the best interest of the system as a whole, since through intellectual inventions realized by a wide variety of individuals, the performativity of the system improves overall. Paralogy is not mere innovationfor its own sake, but a creative and productive resistance to totalizing metanarratives. [Readings, pp.73-74] The approach offers justice in the sense that the rights of the individual are respected. Paralogy completes Lyotard's project; as he says: "This sketches the outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown." [Lyotard 1984, p.67]