Table of Contents i

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

Acknowledgments viii

Appendix 2.1: Formal Definitions, Propositions, and Proofs 87

Appendix 2.2: Guide to Notation 101

Appendix 4.1: A Survey of GATT Disputes 213

Appendix 4.2: The Database of GATT Disputes, 1948-1993 221

Bibliography 484

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Effects of Uncertainty about Legislators' Preferences on International Bargaining 43

Table 4.1: The Hypothesized Models 178

Table 4.2: Results of Ordered Probit Models of Level of Cooperation 190

Table 4.3: Results of Ordered Probit Models of Bargaining Power 195

Table 4.4: Expectations versus Results 200

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics on GATT Trade Disputes, 1948-1993 217

Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics on GATT Dispute Database Variables 218

Table 4.7: Bivariate Correlations among GATT Dispute Database Variables 219

Table 5.1: Summary of the Cases 265

Table 5.2: Data on Political Parties in the Canadian House of Commons, 1988-1991 285

Table 5.3: Data on Political Parties and Turnover in the US Congress, 1987-

1995 297

Table 5.4: Data on Party Discipline in the US Congress, 1987-1994 299

Table 5.5: Japanese Political Parties: Seats in the House of Representatives and Membership in the Governing Coalition 423

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: The Bargaining Space 57

Figure 2.2: Sequence of Moves 60

Figure 2.3: Characterization of Congressional Types 64

Figure 2.4: Various Equilibrium Proposals as a Function of q 68

Figure 2.5: How the Proposal Depends on in an Equilibrium with a Single Elicited Proposal 72

Figure 2.6: A Sample Equilibrium with Two Elicited Proposals 75

Figure 2.7: Values of as a Function of q that Numerically Solve (2.11) 93

Figure 2.8: The Set of Expected Utility Pairs for the President and Foreign Negotiator 99

Figure 3.1: Example of Range of Possible Locations of Swing Voter in Two-Party versus Multiparty Legislatures 113

Figure 3.2: Summary of Argument with Domestic Institutional Variables 128

Figure 3.3: Competing Arguments 138

Figure 4.1: Outline of the Argument 164

Figure 4.2: The Occurrence of GATT Disputes over Time 216

Figure 5.1: Party Discipline in the US Congress, 1945-1995 300

Figure 5.2: Seniority in the US House and Senate, from the 83rd through the 103rd Congress 314

Figure 5.3: Personal and Standing Committee Staff in the US Congress, 1947-1991 315

Figure 5.4: Selected Uncertainty Indicators from the US Congress, 1947-1991: The Number of Committees and Multiple Referrals 316

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