POLS 585J: International Institutions

Political Science 585J: International Institutions

Emory University, Spring 2000, Call No. 0652

Section 000, Tarbutton Hall 113

M 9:30a-12:00p

February 4, 2000

Professor: Eric Reinhardt

Office: 333 Tarbutton Hall

Office hours: T 1:00p-3:00p & by appointment

Phone: 404-727-4977

Email: erein@emory.edu

My home page: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/

Course home page: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/courses/pols585j/

Course Description & Objectives

This is an advanced graduate course on international institutions. The course continues beyond but does not assume prior knowledge of the contents of the international relations field seminar (POLS 510). It does, however, assume a willingness to tackle occasional readings with game theoretic or statistical methods. The course examines mostly formal, governmental institutions, but spends some time more generally on informal and nongovernmental institutions or regimes as well. We ask how institutions are constituted and established, and what makes them evolve and change over time; what effects they have, and how they influence state policy; why they have an impact, if at all; why some institutions are formal and/or public while others are not; how they operate, what their membership and rules are, how they structure decision-making, and what effects those different designs have; and how international institutions affect domestic politics. We begin by examining a variety of competing theoretical perspectives on these questions, and we continue by taking up institutions in specific issue-areas week by week. Our goal is to understand and critique the major approaches to studying international institutions in general, in addition to getting some sense of the empirical variety of such institutions, their forms, and effects.

Requirements

Grades in the course will be based on the following items:

30% — Participation and attendance. Read each item on the required list closely each week, and come to class prepared to pick the readings apart in excruciating detail. You will be doing the talking, not me. To help matters I will distribute a list of questions/issues before each class; look this list over as you read and take notes on the materials, and start to develop your own preliminary answers to these questions.

30% — Literature review paper, 10-14 pages. Choose a topic and review the major scholarly studies on that topic. Clearly state the puzzle or research question you want to focus on, explain the answers to that question put forward in the literature (and how the literature substantiates its claims), and, most importantly, critique the literature, identifying common strengths and limitations in theory and evidence. Due Mon, Mar 20.

40% — Research design paper, 14-20 pages. Choose your own topic, distinct from the one used for the literature review assignment, and produce a paper written like a publishable article, up to the point of actually collecting and analyzing data. Identify a puzzle, summarize the competing answers in the literature and why they are insufficient, discuss your own theory and hypotheses if appropriate, outline a design for an empirical investigation to falsify or validate the competing arguments, discuss data sources and coding methods, and discuss the implications of your potential findings for theory and policy. Don’t write a "graduate-school" sort of paper; make this read like an article with its results chopped off. Due Wed, May 3.

I also suggest you read major news items concerning international institutions or organizations, e.g., from the New York Times (front page and international sections), the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, or the Economist (you might also check out the Far Eastern Economic Review). Many other periodicals in full-text on-line at Lexis-Nexis (http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe). The IMF’s Finance & Development free magazine is often useful.

Course Policies

Late papers and assignments will be penalized. Each day the assignment is late will result in a drop of a half letter grade, e.g., A to A-, etc. Auditing requires permission of the instructor.

Reading Materials

There are no required textbooks for the course. Instead, the readings will be on reserve in the Department of Political Science commons file. We read about 3, sometimes 4, articles or book chapters per week, reflecting my effort to keep the quantity tractable. That means you should prepare yourself, with extensive notes taken while you read, for highly detailed discussions of each reading prior to that class meeting. Some articles, where noted, will be available on-line, from JSTOR or similar sources.

These journals provide the bulk of our readings, and it may be useful to examine keep up with the literature in them:

International Organization [on JSTOR]

World Politics [on JSTOR]

International Studies Quarterly

American Political Science Review [on JSTOR]

American Journal of Political Science [on JSTOR]

Course Outline

The enumerated readings are mandatory. The bulleted (· ) ones are entirely optional, not assigned for class that day.

Jan 24: Introduction. Course administration.

Part I: Theories of International Institutions

Jan 31: Neoliberal, or institutionalist, theory I.

Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 729-759.

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 85-109.

Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), 226-254.

Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 158-179.

Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987), 491-517.

Feb 7: Institutionalist theory II.

Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade," Economics and Politics 2:1 (March 1990), 1-23.

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions," in Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, eds., Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1995), 5-36.

Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?", International Organization 45:4 (Autumn 1991), 495-538.

Dani Rodrik, "Why Is There Multilateral Lending?", NBER Working Paper 5160, June 1995.

Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy 96:1 (February 1988), 132-163.

Feb 14: Realist theory.

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19:3 (Winter 1994/1995), 5-49.

George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?", International Organization 50:3 (Summer 1996), 379-406.

Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43:3 (April 1991), 336-366.

James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization 52:2 (Spring 1998), 269-306.

Responses to Mearsheimer in International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995), 39-93.

Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 337-354.

Feb 21: Alternative & constructivist perspectives.

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," International Organization 47:2 (Spring 1993), 175-205.

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization 53:4 (Autumn 1999), 699-732.

Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation," International Organization 53:2 (Spring 1999), 267-306.

Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47:4 (Autumn 1993), 565-597.

Part II: International Security Institutions

Feb 28: Alliances.

Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 21-47.
James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (June 1994), 270-297.
Brett Ashley Leeds, "Contracting and Commitment: The Design of Military Alliances," prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Louise Richardson, "The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the Nineteenth Century," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 48-79.
Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 107-139.
Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," International Organization 53:2 (Spring 1999), 343-378.

Mar 6: Collective security.

Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991), 114-161.

Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 5-44.

Lisa L. Martin, "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," World Politics 45:3 (April 1993), 406-432.

E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 2^nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1946).

Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics 38:1 (October 1985), 58-79.

Edward D. Mansfield, "International Institutions and Economic Sanctions," World Politics 47:4 (July 1995), 575-605.

William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "Unilateral versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective," International Studies Quarterly 43:1 (March 1999), 37-58.

Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization 52:3 (Summer 1998), 441-467.

William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995).

Mar 13: Spring break.

Mar 20: Peace settlements. Literature review paper due.

Virginia Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," typescript, Columbia University, January 2000.
Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," American Political Science Review 91 (1997), 339-360.
Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," American Journal of Political Science 43:3 (July 1999), 912-934.

Page Fortna, "The Peacekeeping Puzzle: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," typescript, Columbia University, January 2000.

Mar 27: The rules of war.

James D. Morrow, "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties," prepared for delivery at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), 69-88.
Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), 114-152.
Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism," International Organization 51:1 (Winter 1997), 31-63.

Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, **TBA**.

Part III: Institutions in International Political Economy

Apr 3: Multilateral trade institutions: GATT & WTO.

Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 273-314.

Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Paper 6049, May 1997.

Robert W. Staiger, "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics, vol. III (New York: Elsevier, 1995), 1495-1551.

Anne O. Krueger, "Introduction," in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), 1-14.

Richard Blackhurst, "The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfill Its Mandate," in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), 31-58.

John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London: Pinter, 1998), 59-100.

See the World Trade Organization FAQ for background.

Apr 10: Regional economic institutions: the European Union (EU).

Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization 47:1 (Winter 1993), 41-76.

Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, "The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union," International Organization 52:1 (Winter 1998), 149-176.

Karen J. Alter, "Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’? European Governments and the European Court of Justice," International Organization 52:1 (Winter 1998), 121-148.

Dissent and debate, Geoffrey Garrett vs. Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Organization 49:1 (Winter 1995), 171-190.

Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," International Organization 52:1 (Winter 1998), 177-210.

Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," International Organization 45:1 (Winter 1991), 19-56.

Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal Market," International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992), 533-560.

Wayne Sandholtz, "Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe," World Politics 45:2 (January 1993), 242-270.

Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L. Brunell, "Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community," American Political Science Review 92:1 (March 1998), 63-81.

Smith, Mitchell P. 1997. "The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic Asset in Domestic Politics." In At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission, ed. Neill Nugent. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pp. 167-86.

Apr 17: Multilateral financial institutions: IMF & World Bank.

(re-read) Dani Rodrik, "Why Is There Multilateral Lending?", NBER Working Paper 5160, June 1995.

Stanley Fischer, "The Asian Crisis and the Changing Role of the IMF," Finance & Development 35:2 (June 1998), 2-5.

Jeffrey Sachs, "The IMF and the Asian Flu," American Prospect (March-April 1998), 16+.

Tony Killick, "Principals, Agents, and the Limitations of IMF Conditionality," World Economy 19:2 (March 1996), 211-229.

Graham Bird, "The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy Options," International Organization 50:3 (Summer 1996), 477-511.

Benjamin Cohen, "Balance of Payments Financing: Evolution of a Regime," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 315-336.

International Monetary Fund, "IMF Chronology," September 1998.

Stanley Fischer, "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," January 3, 1999.

Alassane D. Ouattara, "The International Financial Institutions: A View from the IMF," February 3, 1999.

Harold James, "From Grandmotherliness to Governance: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality," Finance & Development 35:4 (December 1998), 44-47.

Manuel Guitián, "Conditionality: Past, Present, Future," IMF Staff Papers 42:4 (December 1995), 792-835.

Anne O. Krueger, "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?," Journal of Economic Literature 36:4 (December 1998), 1983-2020.

Beth A. Simmons, "Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements," World Politics 45:3 (April 1993), 361-405.

C. Randall Henning, "Political Economy of the Bretton Woods Institutions: Adapting to Financial Change," World Economy 19:2 (March 1996), 173-193.

Richard E. Feinberg, "The Changing Relationship Between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund," International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), 545-560.

Jeffrey D. Sachs, "International Policy Coordination: The Case of the Developing Country Debt Crisis," in Martin Feldstein, ed., International Economic Cooperation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 233-283.

Charles Lipson, "The International Organization of Third World Debt," International Organization 35:4 (Autumn 1981), 603-631.

Paul Krugman, "Asia: What Went Wrong," Fortune (March 2, 1998), 32.

Bird, Graham, and Dane Rowlands. 1997. "The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions." World Economy 20(November):967-91.

Cottarelli, Carlo, and Curzio Giannini. 1998. "Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund." Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment No. 98/12. International Monetary Fund.

Dhonte, Pierre. 1997. "Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility." Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment No. 97/2. International Monetary Fund.

Fairman, David, and Michael Ross. 1996. "Old Fads, New Lessons: Learning from Economic Development Assistance." In Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promise, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pp. 29-51.

Apr 24: International environmental institutions.

Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner, "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:4 (Fall 1993), 93-112.

Peter Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43:3 (1989), 377-405.

M. J. Peterson, "International Fisheries Management," in Peter Haas, Marc A. Levy, and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).

Elinor Ostrom and Michael McGinnis, "Design Principles for Local and Global Commons," in Oran R. Young, ed., The International Political Economy and International Institutions, vol. II (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), 465-93.

Harold Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, "Improving Compliance with International Environmental Accords," Global Governance 1:2 (June 1995), 119-149.

Ronald B. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," International Organization 48:3 (Summer 1994), 425-459.

May 1: Human rights institutions.

Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), 153-185.

Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Organization 40:3 (Summer 1986), 599-643.

Rachel Brett, "Human Rights and the OSCE," Human Rights Quarterly 18 (August 1996), 668-693.

"A World Court for Criminals," Economist 353 (October 9, 1999), 19-20.

Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., Toward an International Criminal Court? Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Institutions of International Justice," Journal of International Affairs 52:2 (Spring 1999), 473-491.

May 3 (Wed): Research design paper due, 4pm, Prof. Reinhardt’s office. (No class.)

Other Interesting Topics We Won’t Cover

Regional Trade Institutions

J. Michael Finger, "GATT’s Influence on Regional Arrangements," in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, New Dimensions in Regional Integration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 128-148.
John Whalley, "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?", NBER Working Paper 5552, April 1996.
Richard E. Baldwin, "The Causes of Regionalism," World Economy 20:7 (November 1997), 865-888.

Douglas A. Irwin, "Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective," in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, New Dimensions in Regional Integration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 90-119.

International Dispute Settlement Institutions

Eric Reinhardt, "Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948-1998," prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, February 17-20.

John H. Jackson, "Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal, and Prospects," in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), 161-180.

Marc L. Busch, "Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes Under GATT," prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Beth Simmons, title unknown, prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Exchange Rate Regimes

John Gerald Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36:2 (Spring 1982), 195-231.
Barry Eichengreen, "Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System," in Richard N. Cooper et al., eds., Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1989), 255-298.
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 4^th ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 540-548, 548-553, 559-567 (Bretton Woods and its fall).
Agénor, Pierre-Richard. 1994. "Credibility and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries." Journal of Development Economics 45(October):1-16.
Chris Canavan and Mariano Tommasi, "On the Credibility of Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes," Journal of Development Economics 54 (1997), 101-122.

European Monetary Integration

Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," International Organization 47:1 (Winter 1993), 1-41.

Weber, Axel. 1991. "EMS Credibility." Economic Policy 12(April):57-102.
Giavazzi, Francesco, and Marco Pagano. 1994. "The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility." In Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Volume 1: Credibility, ed. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pp. 225-46.

Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 152-181 (on European monetary integration attempts).
Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-71, 159-178 on EMU.

Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Monetary System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
Michael Bleaney and Paul Mizen, "Credibility and Disinflation in the European Monetary System," Economic Journal 107 (November 1997), 1751-1767.

Domestic Politics and International Institutions

Judith Goldstein, "International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the Liberalization of International Trade," in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), 133-152.

Eric Reinhardt, "Tying Hands without a Rope: Rational Domestic Response to International Institutional Constraints," typescript, Emory University, October 1999.

Jon C. Pevehouse, "International Influences and Democratic Consolidation," prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Judith Goldstein, "International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws," International Organization 50:4 (Autumn 1996), 541-564.

Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40:4 (1996), 451-479.

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, "The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments," Economic Journal 105 (November 1995), 1381-1402.

Dueling Institutions

Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt, "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of the GATT on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
Marc L. Busch, "Overlapping Institutions and Global Commerce: The Calculus of Forum Shopping for Dispute Settlement in Canada-U.S. Trade," prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, February 17-20.