Meeting # 7: Peace settlements.

Mar 20: Peace settlements. Literature review paper due.
    1. Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," American Political Science Review 91 (1997), 339-360.
    2. Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," American Journal of Political Science 43:3 (July 1999), 912-934.
    3. Page Fortna, "The Peacekeeping Puzzle: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," typescript, Columbia University, January 2000.
    4. Virginia Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," typescript, Columbia University, January 2000.

 

Questions for Discussion

  1. What difference does the institutional nature of a peace settlement make for the probability of the recurrence of conflict? What would a realist, institutionalist, and constructivist say? Explain their logics.
  2. What components of a peace settlement matter, and how? Identify the individual parameters an institutionalist might point to in this regard: e.g., whether a monitoring provision exists, etc. Explain how each might influence the prob. of recurrent conflict. Which components, if any, matter the most? Explain your claim.
  3. Does the formality of a peace settlement matter? Think of Lipson in this regard.
  4. If peace settlements affect future behavior, do they do so primarily due to the norms they reflect and impose, or because of changed incentives and information, along traditional institutionalist lines?
  5. What does the evidence suggest about the validity of the competing arguments here?
  6. What explains the nature and institutional form of a peace settlement in the first place? What does your answer imply with respect to your answers to the questions above?