

**THE PEACEKEEPING PUZZLE:
CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND EMPIRICAL EFFECTS**

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Abstract

Peacekeeping is perhaps the international community's most important tool for maintaining peace in the aftermath of war. Peacekeeping is not well understood however; its operation is under-theorized and its effects under-tested. The causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers actually keep peace have not been spelled out, and no one has endeavored to show empirically whether peace is more likely to last when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent. A quick comparison reveals a puzzle: peace appears more likely to fail when peacekeepers are present to guard it than when they are not. This article explores how peacekeeping works causally, and examines the empirical puzzle. Using both quantitative analysis and qualitative comparison, I show that selection effects drive the puzzling negative result, and go on to evaluate the extent to which peacekeeping empirically helps to keep the peace. Peacekeepers can help adversaries to maintain peace by raising the cost of attack at the margins, and more important, by preventing and controlling accidents and incidents that can spiral back to war.

Cooperation is difficult in international relations, cooperation among deadly enemies all the more so. In the aftermath of war, belligerents must cooperate to maintain a cease-fire, and the international community is often called on to help. Arguably the most important innovation in international conflict management in the last fifty years is the practice of peacekeeping: the concept of sending personnel from the international community to monitor a cease-fire or to interpose themselves between belligerents to keep peace in the aftermath of war, and more recently, to monitor elections or even administer a state recently torn by civil war.¹

Peacekeepers are either unarmed or at most lightly armed for defensive purposes only. They operate with the consent of the belligerents.² How does their presence prevent the resumption of war? The peacekeeping literature does not spell out how peacekeepers might keep much larger and better armed forces from fighting. Nor has there been systematic empirical analysis of whether peacekeeping works. A cursory look yields a puzzle: peace seemingly falls apart more quickly when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. This article draws on international relations theory to develop the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers might affect the durability of peace, and examines the empirical puzzle. I show that selection effects account for the apparent negative effect of peacekeeping, and demonstrate that

¹ This is usually done by the United Nations, but regional organizations have also undertaken peacekeeping. For example, the Organization of American States monitored the cease-fire between Honduras and El Salvador in the Football war). Peacekeeping is also sometimes done by an ad hoc group, for example the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee sent monitors to observe the cease-fire in Korea.

² The principles of defensive use of force and consent, along with the principle of impartiality are the traditional “golden rules” of peacekeeping.

peacekeeping plays an important role in helping adversaries avoid war.

The beginning of this decade saw an enormous expansion in the number of peacekeeping missions and a dramatic change in the mandates undertaken by UN “blue helmets.” Unshackled from the constraints of the Cold War, the UN launched as many missions between 1988 and 1992 as it had in the organization’s first forty years. As the UN moved beyond “traditional peacekeeping” it became much more involved in civil conflicts and in monitoring and often managing or administering various aspects of transitions to peace within states, including elections, and demobilization or cantonment of forces.³

In the wake of the failure of the UN in Bosnia and the scapegoating of the UN mission in Somalia, the pendulum swung the other way. The United States in particular now seems disillusioned with peacekeeping, favoring more aggressive (and less multilateral) peace enforcement in some cases (such as Kosovo), and a minimal international response in others (Rwanda, for example). As scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping debate the merits of the new wave of peacekeeping, there is a danger of throwing the baby out with the bath water – chucking traditional peacekeeping out with newer more “robust” forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁴ Proponents of peacekeeping such as Shashi Tharoor, argue that traditional

³ Peacekeepers had on occasion been deployed in civil conflicts during the Cold War (in the Congo and in Cyprus, for example) but these missions were intended to contain civil conflicts that might otherwise draw in the great powers, not as in the missions of the 1990s to keep peace between the civil war belligerents themselves.

⁴ On this debate see, for example, Shashi Tharoor, “Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?” *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1995/96) pp.52-64.

peacekeeping should not be thrown out because as he put it “peacekeeping works.”⁵

Does it? Surprisingly this has not been well established. A superficial look at the figures suggests that it may not. Before we can assess the consequences of the expansion of peacekeeping into new roles we need some assessment of peacekeeping’s effectiveness in its traditional roles. In the 1990s a vast literature has sprung up on peacekeeping. This literature includes evaluations and explanations of the success or failure of peacekeeping missions, debates over the use of force, the merits of the new wave of non-traditional peacekeeping, and numerous case studies.⁶ It is a literature that is improving rapidly, but peacekeeping remains under-

⁵ Presentation at Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation. February 9, 1999. Tharoor is former Special Assistant to the UN Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations.

⁶ See for example: James H. Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); Duane Bratt, “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1996) pp.64-81; Jocelyn Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping and the New World Order* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds. *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); William J. Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); William J. Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); A.B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Ernst B. Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1985*, Policy Papers in International Affairs (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986); Claus Heje, “United Nations Peacekeeping -- an Introduction,” in *A Future for Peacekeeping?*, ed. Edward Moxon-Browne (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp.1-25; Lise Morjé Howard, “The United Nations and Civil War Termination: Success, Failure, and Organizational Change” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, Forthcoming); John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1984); Adam Roberts, “The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping,” in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed.

theorized and under-tested. In particular, two very conspicuous gaps remain. Very little has been done to spell out systematically the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace; and, more glaring, virtually no one has endeavored to show empirically whether peace is more likely to last when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent. In this article I begin to fill these gaps.

The first section of the paper reviews the functions identified in the peacekeeping literature and then draws on international relations theories of cooperation to develop the causal links through which peacekeeping is meant to keep the peace. The second section begins with an empirical puzzle: peace appears to fall apart **more** quickly when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. I show, however, that selection effects drive this puzzle. I go on to assess the effectiveness of peacekeeping empirically, using both quantitative analysis and qualitative comparisons of cases where peacekeepers were present and those where they were not. Peacekeeping is not a panacea of course. It cannot stop a determined aggressor from reinitiating war. However, the presence of peacekeepers can affect the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining peace or renewing war. And perhaps more important, peacekeeping is an effective tool for helping adversaries to avoid the risks of unwanted or accidental war.

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), pp.297-320; Stephen Ryan, "The Theory of Conflict Resolution and the Practice of Peacekeeping," in *A Future for Peacekeeping?* ed. Edward Moxon-Browne (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp.26-39; Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?"; Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) and the journal *International Peacekeeping*.

Causal Mechanisms of Peacekeeping

The literature on peacekeeping is descriptive and prescriptive and almost completely atheoretical. Even the more “academic” books on the subject list the functions and principles of peacekeeping and describe its practices rather than spell out a theory of how peacekeeping is supposed to work. In a volume entitled *Towards a Theory of Peacekeeping*, Fetherston decries the failure of the peacekeeping literature to explain the connection between peacekeeping and “positive peace,” that is, the resolution of issues over which the war was fought as opposed to simply maintaining a cease-fire.⁷ But the gap in the theory is much wider than that. Neither Fetherston’s book, nor the peacekeeping literature at large, spells out explicitly how international forces or monitors are meant to maintain a cease-fire. The connection between peacekeeping and even negative peace has not been well theorized.⁸

Peacekeeping was developed on the fly, improvised to respond to particular international crises. UN monitors were sent to report on conflicts and then to observe the cease-fires in Palestine in 1948 and 1949, and in Kashmir in 1948.⁹ The further step of sending armed peacekeeping forces (as opposed to monitors) was the brain child in part of Lester Pearson, a

⁷ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*. The distinction between negative and positive peace is often referred to as the difference between conflict management and conflict resolution, or between peacekeeping and peacemaking.

⁸ On the disconnect between peacekeeping practice and theory, see also Ryan, “The Theory of Conflict Resolution and the Practice of Peacekeeping.” Perhaps the most theoretical work is Rikhye’s classic, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*.

⁹ For a comprehensive study of peace observation missions under the League of Nations, interamerican organizations and the UN in its first twenty years, see David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

Canadian diplomat, during the Suez crisis.¹⁰ He envisioned a “UN force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out . . . a truly international peace and police force.”¹¹ The United Nations Emergency Force was a face-saving cover to get Britain and France off the hook after their invasion of Egypt in 1956. During peacekeeping operations in the Congo, in Cyprus, the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the principles and functions of “classic” peacekeeping were developed. Key principles defining peacekeeping include the consent of the parties involved, impartiality in their dispute, and the non-use of force.

The literature on peacekeeping identifies two main functions: observation and interposition.¹² First, by observing and reporting the parties’ behavior, peacekeepers ensure that no one is violating the agreement. Observers also help resolve minor violations of the cease-fire before they escalate.¹³ Second, by interposing themselves between belligerents, peacekeepers create a buffer to help prevent incidents and accidents. International monitors perform the first function; armed international peacekeeping forces perform both observation and interposition functions.¹⁴ The presence of peacekeepers is also thought to provide a moral barrier to hostile

¹⁰ Dag Hammarskjöld and Brian Urquhart were also instrumental in creating this new practice at the UN.

¹¹ Quoted in Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 1994 paperback ed. (New York: Norton, 1972). Note that the peacekeepers were not meant to work out a political settlement, merely to maintain the cease-fire while diplomacy could take place.

¹² Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Second ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1997).

¹³ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*; Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*.

¹⁴ Monitoring missions typically range in size from a few dozen observers to several hundred and are unarmed (though typically observers are military personnel). Peacekeeping

action.¹⁵

By their presence and their ability to observe, peacekeepers are meant to help keep the peace. But how exactly does this work? How do lightly or unarmed personnel, there strictly with the consent of the belligerents, prevent the resumption of war? Peacekeepers will be powerless in the face of determined aggression, while if the belligerents intend to observe the cease-fire anyway, peacekeepers are seemingly unnecessary. What are the causal mechanisms linking peacekeeping to the maintenance of a cease-fire?

Maintaining peace in the aftermath of war requires cooperation.¹⁶ But for well-known reasons cooperation is difficult in international affairs. It is particularly difficult between adversaries. Like most cooperative arrangements in international relations, cease-fires operate on the basis of reciprocity. The belligerents agree to stop hostilities simultaneously, each side commits to maintaining the cease-fire as long as the other does, and if one side attacks, the other promptly responds in kind. Fundamentally, it is the prospect of retaliation that deters either side

forces are lightly armed for “defensive purposes” and these missions have ranged from about twelve hundred to thirteen thousand troops. In this article I use the general term peacekeeping to refer to both types of missions, and use the terms monitoring and peacekeeping forces or armed peacekeepers to distinguish between them when necessary.

¹⁵ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*.

¹⁶ Because war is costly, both sides benefit from peace. But conflicting interests and incentives to take advantage of each other prevent this shared interest from automatically resulting in peace. These conditions define the problem of cooperation. See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Kenneth A. Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

from defecting from the agreement.¹⁷ But for reciprocity to work, three things have to be true: the long term gains of peace must outweigh the short-term benefits of attacking; violations of the agreement must be easily detected; and accidents or unauthorized violations must be prevented or controlled lest they spiral back to full-scale war. These obstacles to cooperation are particularly problematic in the immediate aftermath of war. The parties to a cease-fire agreement are by definition deadly enemies and they almost certainly have strong incentives to take advantage of each other.¹⁸ If one side sees an opportunity for a quick or relatively cheap victory, it will likely forego the cease-fire for advantage on the battlefield. Levels of tension and mistrust are extremely high in the immediate aftermath of war, creating incentives to react quickly and forcefully to any hint of a cease-fire violation rather than waiting for a possible attack to unfold. If accidental or unauthorized violations occur, reciprocity itself can quickly drive a spiral of retaliation back to full-scale war. Cease-fires are fragile.¹⁹

How does peacekeeping help? Peacekeeping can contribute to reciprocal arrangements in

¹⁷ The problem of maintaining peace in the aftermath of war can be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. As the folk theorem tells us, reciprocal strategies allow cooperative equilibria in iterated play.

¹⁸ The war is unlikely to have resolved the issues over which it was fought. Resolution of political issues has been extremely rare in interstate wars since World War II. In only a few of the interstate wars ending since 1946 have the issues that led to war been settled explicitly, and in two of these (Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur war, and Iran and Iraq after their war in the 1980s) settlement was not reached until several years after the fighting had stopped. The Gulf War is the only case of explicit settlement at the time of a cease-fire, and this settlement is clearly troubled. [Page Fortna, Cease-Fires Dataset, 1998].

¹⁹ For a fuller discussion of the obstacles to cooperation in the aftermath of war, see Virginia Page Fortna, "A Peace that Lasts: Agreements and the Durability of Peace" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998).

several ways: by increasing the costs of attack, by providing a neutral referee, and by preventing and controlling accidental violations and skirmishes. Peacekeeping might alter the costs and benefits of maintaining the cease-fire or attacking. In theory, a large international military force could physically deter an attack by either side. Part of the effort of retaliating against an attack could thus be delegated to the international force. Alternatively, the force might serve as a trip-wire, with any attempt to roll past it bringing outside military forces into the conflict. In practice, however, peacekeeping's role as a physical constraint is quite limited. Peacekeeping forces are not large or well-armed. The UN does not retaliate with force against violations of a cease-fire. The presence of a buffer force may raise the cost of an attack slightly simply by being in the way, and it may make surprise attack more difficult by detecting preparations for war.²⁰ However, lightly armed forces operating on the basis of consent and the non-use of force can not present a strong deterrent.

If peacekeepers affect the cost of attack they do so through international opinion. The "spotlight of international attention" may help to deter violations of the agreement. Blatant violations of a cease-fire often have diplomatic costs in the Security Council and can entail tangible losses in economic or military aid.²¹ The presence of peacekeepers, in other words, induces international audience costs by publicizing infractions. These increased costs may not outweigh the benefits of an attack, but at the margins they make it more costly to reinitiate war.

²⁰ The UN can also respond diplomatically to preparations for war in an effort to prevent it. See Howard, "The United Nations and Civil War Termination."

²¹ Even for states with a powerful ally in the Security Council willing to veto any UN sanctions, blatant violations can temper that ally's diplomatic support.

Belligerents are aware that agreeing to peacekeeping will tie their hands to some extent.

Willingness to accept a peacekeeping force can therefore also serve as a credible signal of intention to maintain a cease-fire.

The second requirement of reciprocity is that violations be detected. Retaliation is only possible if cheating is caught. And in the tense atmosphere of mistrust immediately after war, belligerents may not feel they can wait until after an attack is underway to react.²² Here the observation function of peacekeeping forces and monitors comes into play. The presence of peacekeepers or international observers can help reassure both sides that the other is complying in good faith with the cease-fire agreement. In some cases, such as the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai, peacekeepers provide early warning to former belligerents.

In general, however, the real effect of peacekeepers' monitoring efforts is more indirect than direct. States will rely for the most part on their own intelligence to detect impending attack, and cease-fire violations are by their nature very obvious events for the receiving side. Verification of secondary aspects of an agreement (staying out of demilitarized areas or complying with agreed on arms limitations, for example) may be needed. However, the parties to a cease-fire do not generally need monitors to tell them whether one side is complying, in fact peacekeepers generally respond to complaints of violations lodged by one of the parties. Rather, monitors' most important role is to serve as a neutral referee. Because of the diplomatic costs

²² It may also be important that both sides know they will not be retaliated against unless they cheat. For if there is a good chance that one will be unjustly blamed for defection and bear the brunt of retaliation, one might as well act first to reap the gains of attacking first. Thanks to Jeff Lewis for this idea. See George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, *Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton

associated with breaking a cease-fire, there is strong incentive for an aggressor to blame the other side for provoking retaliation. Claims of being the victim of attack are therefore not necessarily credible, and as in any playground squabble there are likely to be disputes over “who started it.” Monitors thus act as referees. Neutral investigation of incidents gives credible information on compliance and is therefore important for distinguishing unprovoked aggression from legitimate retaliation. Accurate and unbiased monitoring therefore works in close conjunction with the audience costs discussed above. In this capacity, observers provide information not primarily to the belligerents themselves, but to the international community.

The contribution of peacekeeping to the third requirement of reciprocity is perhaps the least understood.²³ Reliance on reciprocity makes cease-fire agreements very vulnerable to accidents, misunderstandings, or small incidents. Because violations are met with immediate retaliation in a reciprocal arrangement, if troops stray over the cease-fire line, or fire accidentally, or if leaders do not command full control over their troops and an unauthorized attack takes place, the other side will respond in kind, and a vicious cycle of retaliation can quickly spiral back to war. Even if leaders on one side suspect that a violation occurred by mistake, it may be too risky not to respond. And if the original incident is publicly known, there may be strong domestic pressure to respond with force. It is rare for states to be drawn into war purely by accident, it requires deliberate action to decide to retaliate. But the familiar dynamic of the security dilemma and the spiral model of war initiation suggests how accidental incidents or

University Press, 1995).

²³ This mechanism is the least discussed in the literature, though practitioners of peacekeeping are likely to know it very well.

violations might spiral back to full-scale war.²⁴

The peacekeeping literature often refers in passing to the peacekeepers' role in local mediation and conflict resolution. This is generally inserted in discussions of peacekeepers' observer function, but this role deserves further analysis as a causal mechanism in its own right.²⁵ Much of the day-to-day work of peacekeepers involves activities to prevent violations from spiraling out of control. This work operates on two levels. At the local level, peacekeepers often respond to skirmishes or isolated incidents by meeting with local military commanders and arranging restoration of a cease-fire. This local level dispute resolution can snuff out sparks before they start a conflagration. Peacekeepers also often work preventively, for example, making local arrangements for both sides to pull forces back from a cease-fire line that leaves them dangerously close to each other. Local military commanders might be able to resolve disputes or work out preventive arrangements on their own, but in the tense atmosphere following a war bilateral communication is difficult. Local commanders' primary concern is military security, not necessarily the avoidance of a spiral toward war. An impartial actor, immune from the security dilemma, can take the initiative to bring commanders together or to arrange mutual consent for restoration of a cease-fire in a way that makes no one look weak or lose face. Interpositional peacekeeping forces that patrol a demilitarized zone help prevent accidents and skirmishes simply by separating combatants who would otherwise be dangerously

²⁴ On spirals, misperceptions and accidents see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²⁵ See for example, Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*; and Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*.

close to one another. Local accident prevention and control can therefore help prevent a spiral to renewed warfare.

Spiral control also operates on the state-to-state level. The machinery of lodging formal complaints of violations with the UN who then investigates can play an important political role. It takes governments off the hook for not responding with force to any small violation. If this machinery did not exist, leaders might feel pressure to take a tough stance of retaliation to maintain a show of resolve – either to deter the enemy lest it be testing for weakness, or for domestic political reasons (or both). In the face of a firing incident or a small incursion leaders can use the peacekeeping dispute resolution machinery as an option between ignoring the incident and appearing weak, or responding with force and risking escalation back to full scale war. Using the “proper channels” to lodge a complaint allows for rhetoric of taking the moral high ground through restraint and keeps arguments about who started what, when, and how on the level of verbal diplomatic battles rather than actual battles.

The preceding discussion has specified a number of causal mechanisms through which the presence of international peacekeepers can help to keep peace in the aftermath of war. Peacekeepers can bolster reciprocal peace agreements by increasing the costs of breaking a cease-fire. They make it more difficult to launch a surprise attack and, at the margins, they may make a difference by physically being in the way. More important, however, they add significant international diplomatic costs to violating a cease-fire. Peacekeepers play a crucial monitoring role, serving as a neutral and therefore credible referee reporting on incidents and distinguishing violations of the cease-fire from legitimate and provoked retaliation. Last, but certainly not least,

through local mediation, and by providing a dispute resolution machinery for complaints and investigations, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents and small incidents or skirmishes from spiraling back to war.

Assessing Empirical Effects

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the peacekeeping literature is the dearth of attempts to assess whether peacekeeping empirically helps keep peace. Single case studies of peacekeeping's effect in particular missions either do not address this issue or rely, usually implicitly, on counterfactual assessments.²⁶ There is also comparative work on when peacekeeping is successful and when it is not.²⁷ This work takes peacekeeping missions as its universe of cases. There has been no systematic study of whether peace is more likely to last when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. No one compares peacekeeping cases to non-peacekeeping cases.

There have been a few studies of general UN crisis involvement, including discussion and resolutions, fact-finding and mediating, observation, peacekeeping, and enforcement actions. Ernst Haas has produced a substantial body of work assessing conflict management by

²⁶ See for example Pauline Dawson, *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir* (London: Hurst & Co., 1994); Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*; David Holiday and William Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992).

²⁷ For a good example see Howard, "The United Nations and Civil War Termination." See also Bratt, "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations"; Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*; and Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*.

international organizations. In a 1986 study, for example, he examines interstate disputes referred to the UN, to regional organizations, and non-referred disputes. Of particular note for our purposes, he finds that UN operations of a military nature (that is, observer missions, peacekeeping forces and the one instance of enforcement in Korea) are almost always moderately or greatly successful.²⁸ Unfortunately his measures of success do not allow a direct comparison of disputes involving the UN with non-referred disputes because “success” is measured only for referred disputes. His measures are based on an implicitly counterfactual assessment, presumably relative to no UN involvement.

In a study of UN involvement in crises, however, Wilkenfeld and Brecher find that the UN makes it more likely that a crisis ends in an agreement than when the UN is not involved, but that the UN has no effect on the likelihood of “tension reduction” measured as whether the parties experienced another crisis within five years.²⁹ Surprisingly, however, in this part of their study, the authors do not consider the endogeneity they have identified in the first part of their article: namely that the UN tends to get involved in the most “serious” cases in terms of violence, gravity of threat, and several other indicators.

²⁸ Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations*. See also Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye, *Conflict Management by International Organizations* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972). Success is measured as the organization’s impact in terms of four goals: stopping hostilities, conflict abatement for three years, conflict settlement, and isolation of the conflict. For each referred dispute the UN is coded as failing to achieve, helping to achieve, or fully achieving each goal and an overall success rate is calculated. In only two cases of UN military involvement (Yemen 1963-64, and Namibia 1978 to the time of the study) was impact coded as “none.” Namibia would subsequently become one of the UN’s most promising peacekeeping success stories.

²⁹Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, “International Crises, 1945-1975: The UN Dimension,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (1984) pp.45-67.

In a similar but more quantitatively sophisticated and more recent study, Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel also examine the effects of UN involvement on the recurrence of conflict. While they do not examine when the UN is most likely to get involved, they do control for other factors that might make recurrence more likely, such as the level of violence, the history of conflict, relative power and whether the crisis ends in stalemate, compromise, or victory. Oddly, they also “control” for the level of UN involvement which seems to be the very thing they are assessing. They too find that the UN has no significant effect preventing the recurrence of conflict.³⁰

The peacekeeping literature does not compare peacekeeping cases to non-peacekeeping cases. The literature on UN involvement in general not only lumps peacekeeping in with other forms of UN action or lack thereof, but also comes to contradictory findings – Haas finds positive effects while Wilkenfeld and Brecher and Diehl et al find no significant effects.

To assess the effects of peacekeeping we need to know the universe of cases in which peacekeeping might have been used. I have compiled a dataset of all cease-fires in interstate war ending between 1946 and 1992.³¹ Note that this dataset does not include the new wave of “non-

³⁰ Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel, “UN Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 1996) pp.683-700.

³¹ The list of wars comes from the Correlates of War dataset. Multilateral wars are broken into separate dyads between principal belligerents (defined as states contributing at least 1/10th the number of troops provided by the largest contributor). Wars that stop and start again are split into different cases. Including cease-fires that failed so quickly that the next round of fighting was considered by COW as part of the same war is important to avoid selecting on the dependent variable. For more information on the Cease-Fires Dataset, see Fortna, “A Peace that Lasts”.

traditional” peacekeeping, mostly in civil wars, after the end of the cold war.³² Rather it allows us to assess the effects of traditional peacekeeping operations in interstate wars.³³

Table 1 shows a simple cross-tabulation comparing cease-fires with and without peacekeeping and whether or not war has resumed.³⁴ Peacekeeping is used quite frequently: international peacekeepers are sent in almost three-quarters of the cases (34 out of 47 cease-fire dyads). But from this simple cut, it appears that peacekeeping is not associated with stable peace. Quite the opposite in fact: when peacekeepers are present, war is much more likely to resume. War breaks out anew in over half of the cases where peacekeepers are keeping watch, compared to only 15% of the cases where no international personnel are present.

— [Table 1 about here] —

Table 2 breaks this relationship down by type, distinguishing unarmed monitoring missions from peacekeeping forces. Table 2 indicates that war is slightly more likely to resume when only monitors are sent, rather than armed peacekeeping troops, but the difference is small relative to cases of no peacekeeping, which appear much more stable.

³² During the period studied here there were some peacekeeping missions sent to intervene in civil wars (in Greece, in the Congo, and in Yemen, for example). But these were not sent at the end of a war to keep the conflicts from flaring up again; they were sent **during** the civil war to try to prevent the involvement of great powers that might lead to direct superpower conflict. These civil war cases are not included in the dataset.

³³ Further research extending this analysis to current cases is clearly important. However, there is only now beginning to be enough data to study systematically the effects of peacekeeping in civil wars after the end of the Cold War. The data collection project at Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution is particularly promising.

³⁴ This marks whether war between the same belligerents broke out again, measured up to 1999. The same pattern emerges whether one uses a 5 year cutoff for war resumption, 10 years, a censored duration model on time until a new war, or a logistic regression.

— [Table 2 about here] —

Why this surprising finding? Is peacekeeping really a hindrance to stable peace? Might monitors and troops sent to keep peace actually cause war to resume? There is an argument about possible detrimental effects of peacekeeping; that it can get in the way of long term conflict resolution. This is a moral hazard argument, often made in reference to Cyprus. By keeping a lid on the violence the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has removed any incentive for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to settle their differences. However, this argument cannot explain the negative relationship between peacekeeping and lasting peace in Tables 1 and 2, for they code not whether long-term political settlement has taken place, merely whether violence has re-erupted. And on that front UNFICYP has been remarkably successful, too much so, according to the moral hazard argument.

A more logical explanation for the apparent negative relationship is that it is driven by a selection effect. Peacekeepers do not get sent to a random selection of conflicts that are otherwise more or less equal. They probably get sent where they are most needed; that is, where peace is most likely to break down. Statistics on crime make a good analogy. Crime rates are probably highest in neighborhoods with the most cops on the street, the most programs for troubled youth, etc., not because cops or youth programs cause crime but because they are put in place in response to the likelihood of crime.

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom critique the literature on international regulatory regimes for failing to take into account endogeneity and selection effects.³⁵ As they explain, the finding that

³⁵ George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about

compliance rates with these regimes are high is suspect because they are instituted in relatively easy cases, where states intend to take the required actions in any case. For peacekeeping, the endogeneity and selection effects run the other way. Peacekeepers are likely sent to the most difficult cases.

To judge the effectiveness of peacekeeping we therefore need to know something about the baseline likelihood of war resuming whether or not peacekeepers sent. We need some way to assess the “degree of difficulty” of all the cease-fire cases, and how this is related to whether peacekeepers get sent. Unfortunately this is easier said than done; international relations does not have a highly predictive model for when peace is likely to break down.³⁶

In previous research, however, I have analyzed a number of factors that help shape the baseline prospects for peace at the time of a cease-fire.³⁷ Many of these variables are indeed related to whether peacekeepers get sent in the first place. Peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed after wars that end in a tie rather than a decisive military victory; cases where peace is less likely to last.³⁸ High cost wars, in terms of lives lost, tend not to be repeated, and while

Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* , Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996) pp.379-406.

³⁶ Bremer’s analysis of “dangerous dyads” tells us some factors that are associated with the outbreak of war. These findings inform the analysis below. Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* , Vol. 36, No. 2 (1992) pp.309-341.

³⁷ Fortna, “A Peace that Lasts”.

³⁸ Peacekeeping is also related to the balance of power between the belligerents, but surprisingly relative capabilities at the time of the cease-fire are not a strong predictor of the durability of peace. Fortna, “A Peace that Lasts”. On shifts in relative capabilities over time and their effect on durability see Suzanne Werner, “The Possibility of Recurrent Conflict: A Decision

monitors are sometimes deployed after high cost wars (e.g. Korea, Iran-Iraq), peacekeeping forces tend not to be sent in after very costly wars. Peacekeepers are obviously more likely when belligerents are geographically contiguous. International personnel are also more likely to be sent to keep peace between adversaries with a history of violent conflict, and when the stakes of conflict are particularly high, both significant predictors of whether war will resume.

Peacekeeping forces were never deployed when one of the belligerents was a superpower, although monitors were deployed after the Korean Armistice, and of course the practice of peacekeeping was developed for a case involving great power belligerents (UNEF in Sinai in 1956).

Once one controls for these things statistically, the negative relationship falls away. This can be seen in the shaded portion of Table 3. Table 3 shows the results of a number of censored Weibull regression models testing the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace after a cease-fire.³⁹ Models 1 and 2 give the results when no controls are included. This is another way of showing the relationship discussed in Tables 1 and 2 above. In model 1 we see the significant and strong negative effect of the presence of peacekeepers on the duration of peace as in Table 1.

to End the Peace,” (Presented at the American Political Science Association Meetings: Washington DC: 1997).

³⁹ Duration analysis (sometimes referred to as hazard or survival analysis) allows the investigation of the effects of various factors on how long something, in this case peace, lasts. Duration models such as the Weibull can handle censored data – data in which some of the observations have yet to fail at the time of the study. They can incorporate into their estimates the uncertainty about how long peace will continue to last into the future. On duration models see William H. Greene, *Econometric Analysis* (New York: MacMillan, 1993). Cases are clustered by conflict and robust standard errors are calculated to adjust for autocorrelation among dyads (see Appendix).

Model 2 breaks the peacekeeping category down between monitors and armed peacekeeping forces as in Table 2 above. We see that each category has a negative effect relative to cases where no peacekeepers are sent. This negative effect is significant for armed peacekeepers but misses the conventional $p \leq .05$ significance level for monitors.

— [Table 3 about here] —

Compare these results with those in models 3 and 4 when the “baseline” prospects for peace are controlled for (to the extent possible). Models 3 and 4 control for the decisiveness of victory (with two measures, a dummy differentiating ties from cases with a clear winner and loser, and with a measure of the difference in battle deaths relative to population), the cost of the war in terms of battle deaths, wars between contiguous states (indicated with a dummy variable), the history of conflict between the belligerents before the war (based on militarized disputes), and the stakes of the conflict. For measurement details see the Appendix. In none of the cases involving a superpower as a belligerent has war resumed. Superpower belligerent cases are thus dropped from models 3 and 4 to control for this effect.⁴⁰

Once these variables that affect both the duration of peace and the likelihood of peacekeeping are controlled for, the apparent negative effect of peacekeeping falls away. In model 3 we see that the negative effect of peacekeeping falls to a level statistically equivalent to zero (0.08 with a p-value of .93). In model 4 we see that the coefficient for peacekeeping forces remains negative though it is quite small and it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient for

⁴⁰ The duration model cannot estimate the effect of a variable that is never associated with failure. It estimates that peace will last infinitely long since this is what has been observed so far.

monitoring becomes positive, though it too is small and insignificant.

The fact that the negative effects associated with peacekeeping fall away once the model is more completely specified shows that there is indeed a strong selection effect. Peacekeepers tend to get sent to the places where peace is most difficult to keep. But even controlling as much as possible for the degree of difficulty, we do not find a positive relationship between peacekeeping and the durability of peace. What should we make of this? Is peacekeeping simply ineffective, or is there remaining selection bias not accounted for in the quantitative models? Quantitative measures are necessarily rough; the controls may not fully capture the selection dynamics (see below). Furthermore, these tests include many variables relative to the number of cases, putting a great deal of pressure on the statistical model. Before discarding peacekeeping as an ineffective conflict management tool it is worth looking at this question using qualitative methods.

As mentioned above, the existing case study literature does not compare peacekeeping cases to non-peacekeeping cases. Having created the full dataset, however, I can exploit the fact that there are not many cases to examine each of them qualitatively. It is obviously not possible to examine every case in great depth here. However, it is important to examine the full set of cases. The relatively small N is a liability for statistical analysis but an asset for comprehensive qualitative comparisons. Table 4 lists each of the interstate wars ending between 1946 and 1992, organized by whether or not peacekeepers were present, and the duration of peace.⁴¹

— [Table 4 about here] —

⁴¹ The number of wars is smaller than the N in table 3 because many of the wars consisted

Two things are immediately apparent in the no peacekeeping section at the top of the table. First, all but two of these wars involved a permanent member of the UN Security Council as a belligerent. That peacekeeping operations were not deployed when one side held veto power is not terribly surprising, although as noted above the practice of sending peacekeeping forces began in a war involving Great Britain and France.

Second, and perhaps more important in terms of the likelihood of renewed conflict, the wars in this category are not just cases of military victory for one side, but of extremely lopsided decisive victories. The only case in this time period of the complete elimination of one state by another (Vietnam) falls in this category. The only cases of governments deposed by invading forces (the Soviet Union's ouster of Nagy in Hungary and Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda) also fall in this group. The Falklands war ended in Argentina's unconditional surrender and the Sino-Indian war was also a very decisive victory for the Chinese. There are other decisive victories in the dataset in cases in which peacekeepers were present, notably: Bangladesh, the Six Day War, and the Gulf War. In the first two of these cases, however, monitors were not sent at the time of the decisive victory but were already there, sent after a prior war with a less decisive outcome while the third, the Gulf War, was unusual in that UN monitors were sent to help keep a UN-enforced settlement after a Chapter VII military intervention. It is clear that peacekeepers are not sent to keep peace after wars that end with very decisive victories.

Moreover, in these cases of extremely lopsided victory, the baseline probability of war resuming was close to zero. The most established factor accounting for stability after war is the

of multiple dyads.

decisiveness of the military outcome.⁴² In a manner not fully captured by the quantitative measures of decisiveness, these exceptionally lopsided outcomes explain the low rate of war resumption in the cases without peacekeeping. The selection effect is clear here; peacekeepers are not sent to the easy (decisive victory) cases, they are only needed when maintaining peace is likely to be problematic.

Of the no peacekeeping cases, the ones that ended with less decisive outcomes (the Sino-Indian War to some extent, the Ethiopia-Somalia War, and especially the Sino-Vietnamese War) were followed by armed clashes and skirmishes after the end of the war. There have been numerous incidents along the disputed border between China and India since the war in 1962. Clashes and low-level fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia continued for ten years after the war until an agreement in 1988. In the Sino-Vietnamese case clashes and skirmishes after the war in 1979 escalated back to full scale war six and a half years later. In other words, after wars that end without an extremely lopsided victory the absence of peacekeeping is associated with relatively unstable peace.

In Table 4 we can also see that where the international community does send personnel, armed peacekeeping forces are much more the exception than the rule. Between 1946 and 1992, unarmed monitoring was the tool most often employed to help keep peace.⁴³ The middle section

⁴² See for example, Werner, “The Possibility of Recurrent Conflict.”; Virginia Page Fortna, “A Peace that Lasts: Agreements and the Durability of Peace” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998); and in the civil war context Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995) pp.681-687.

⁴³ Most of the non-traditional peacekeeping operations since 1992 have involved at least some lightly armed personnel, but have also had large civilian components.

of Table 4 shows cases where monitors were deployed. Some of these wars ended in decisive outcomes, though with the exception of the Gulf War none as decisive as most of those in the no-peacekeeping category. In almost all of these cases, whether the war ended in a victory or a tie, at least one side refused to accept the de facto outcome as the settlement of the dispute. For example, the status of Kashmir, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the division of Korea all continued to be vehemently contested after the fighting stopped. El Salvador and Honduras and Iran and Iraq did not reach a settlement in their respective disputes until several years after their cease-fires. Furthermore, in all of these cases a cease-fire was reached that left the adversaries' forces in very close proximity. With troops "eyeball to eyeball" as they say, firing incidents are inevitable and frequent and tensions remain very high. In terms of stability in the immediate aftermath of a cease-fire, all of these were relatively difficult cases. The need for a neutral referee and for on the ground mediation and dispute resolution was high.

United Nations monitoring got off to a rough start. The new organization's first mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) sent to Palestine during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. A small group of UN monitors was originally sent to observe a four week temporary truce in June 1948.⁴⁴ After another short stint of fighting, a Security Council ordered cease-fire went into effect on July 18. This cease-fire was meant to be permanent and a larger team of 572 observers was deployed. However, fighting resumed when Israel launched an offensive in the Negev and then western Galilee. The cease-fire had lasted only three months, during which the UN was a target; UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated by a

⁴⁴ Interestingly, both sides complied with this truce right through the day it expired, even

Jewish terrorist organization. Cease-fires along the various fronts and a series of General Armistice Agreements between Israel and each of the frontline Arab states finally ended the war in 1949. After its initial failure, UNTSO monitors helped keep the peace for almost eight years between Israel and Egypt until Israel attacked with British and French support during the Suez crisis, and almost twenty years between Israel and both Syria and Jordan.

The United Nation's second mission was the UN Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the cease-fire after the First Kashmir War in 1949. UNMOGIP helped keep the peace between India and Pakistan for almost seventeen years until the outbreak of war in 1965. Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still in place today.

How one judges these results depends in part on the counterfactual. The strife between Arabs and Israelis, and that between India and Pakistan have been the two most intractable interstate conflicts since World War II. Does the fact that these wars re-erupted while observers kept watch mean that monitoring was ineffective? Or was renewed war inevitable and the fact that peace lasted as long as it did testament to the effect of monitoring? Is the glass half empty or half full?

To get at the effects of monitoring it helps to examine the day-to-day operations over time. Both of these missions served mostly to deal with skirmishes and incidents and to keep them from escalating out of control. Monitors acted as impartial referees over "who started it," provided on-the-spot investigation and mediation, worked out small troop withdrawals to stabilize cease-fire lines and worked to reestablish cease-fires when clashes took place. These

though attacking as the end of the truce neared would presumably have been advantageous.

missions did not generally provide early warning (although UNMOGIP did inform India of Pakistan's preparations for war in 1965⁴⁵) nor were they large enough to serve as any kind of buffer. As the examples below indicate, they were much more about dispute resolution and preventing accidental spirals.

In the early years of its operation, UNTSO was relatively effective at putting out sparks, and there were many sparks to put out. Along the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Syria, for example, there were numerous incidents and armed clashes over fishing rights in Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), between Arab and Jewish farmers in the demilitarized zones, and over Israel's civil engineering projects in the demilitarized areas. Israel intended to exert its sovereignty over the demilitarized areas, while Syria claimed the territorial issue was unresolved and contested Israel's actions, often by force. These disputes and clashes, and others like them on Israel's other fronts, were investigated on the spot by UNTSO observers and discussed in the Military Armistice Commissions (MACs) set up between Israel and each of its neighbors. Investigation and mediation of cease-fires during clashes were both quite effective in keeping the level of violence along the cease-fire lines to a minimum.⁴⁶ The Armistice Agreements of 1949 were meant to be very temporary arrangements while a political settlement was worked out. As

⁴⁵ Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).

⁴⁶ For detailed accounts on UNTSO and its operations see Pablo de Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1966); Gen. Odd Bull, *War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and Views of a U.N. Observer* (London: Leo Cooper, 1976); Lt.Gen. E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, Second ed. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969); David Brook, *Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Armistice System* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1964); E.H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956); Lucien Lee Kinsolving, "The Israeli-Syrian Demilitarized Zones: The UN Security Council Record" (Masters, American University, 1967).

it became clear that settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was not possible, the machinery set up in the agreements to try to keep peace began to break down.⁴⁷ The dispute resolution procedures of the MACs, for example, became fora more for mutual accusation and recrimination than for resolving problems. The MACs were largely defunct by the mid 1950s, and after the Six Day War in 1967 Israel stopped cooperating with the UN dispute resolution machinery altogether, so while monitors were still present, they were much less active in terms of day-to-day operations and investigations. Peace was much less stable after the 1967 war. Clashes along the Israeli-Egyptian front reached full-scale war in the War of Attrition in 1970, and the whole region was again at war in 1973. Monitors could not have prevented the 1973 war. Whether an active monitoring operation might have helped prevent the escalation between Israel and Egypt is impossible to say. Many other factors were at work of course, but it is notable that the period between 1967 and 1973, which might have been expected to be relatively stable after Israel's decisive victory was the only period without active UN monitors or peacekeeping forces (see below), and was the least stable period in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In Kashmir we see a similar pattern: monitors were very effective early on but after years of negotiations failed to settle the Kashmir conflict, tensions rose and in 1965 Pakistan and India were again at war. In its first sixteen years UNMOGIP “fulfilled its basic prophylactic task of helping to maintain local calm and to defuse such incidents as occurred.”⁴⁸ UNMOGIP's

⁴⁷ Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine*; Bull, *War and Peace in the Middle East*; Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*.

⁴⁸ Dawson, *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir*. See also Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991) and Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* for similar evaluations of UNMOGIP's effects.

presence and investigations helped India and Pakistan to contain the inevitable clashes and for years to avoid war.⁴⁹ Pakistan's decision to instigate guerilla attacks, thus triggering war in 1965 was not prevented by the monitors, though the decision covertly to sponsor guerillas rather than conducting an outright invasion reflects Pakistan's concern not to be seen as the aggressor. This strategy worked; the world initially condemned India for its response and for being the first to attack across the cease-fire line and the international border. After the Second Kashmir War in 1965 a distinct UN monitoring mission (the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission, or UNIPOM) was sent to the international boundary between India and Pakistan (as opposed to the disputed line within Kashmir) to oversee a rather tense cease-fire and later, after the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966, the withdrawal of forces to the status quo ante bellum. This mission of 90 observers was highly successful, but was no longer needed after the withdrawals and was terminated in March.⁵⁰ Meanwhile UNMOGIP was still in place in Kashmir. UNMOGIP continued to be active in stabilizing day-to-day skirmishes, but India, never a big fan of UN involvement in the dispute, became very mistrustful of the international organization after its failure to condemn Pakistan publicly for initiating the 1965 war.⁵¹ The mission's effectiveness

⁴⁹ On UNMOGIP see Dawson, *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir*; Joseph Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Alastair Lamb, *The Kashmir Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

⁵⁰ UN, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, Third ed. (New York: United Nations, 1996).

⁵¹ India's wariness of UN involvement reflected reluctance to hold the plebiscite promised in Kashmir in 1949 as part of UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions, as well as a desire to settle issues with Pakistan bilaterally. It also stemmed in large part from the sovereignty concerns of a relatively new state. As is often the case, states who have newly won independence from colonial powers are reluctant to allow international forces back on their soil.

was greatly diminished after the second outbreak of violence.

This case highlights a bind the UN is in when a cease-fire it is monitoring is violated, not through accidental or small incidents, but deliberately (though covertly in this case). The UN is highly concerned with maintaining the perception of impartiality. UNMOGIP observers reported Pakistan's actions to New York, but if the UN publicly condemns the initiator as an "aggressor" it jeopardizes its ability to mediate to reinstate the cease-fire, which is the organization's highest priority. Stopping the immediate killing takes precedence over longer term considerations of credibility. In 1965 U Thant considered going public with reports of Pakistani's violation of the cease-fire, and issued a draft report to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan of course objected.⁵² U Thant decided to keep quiet:

Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicting or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it.⁵³

However, if the UN does not condemn aggression, then what is the point of monitoring? For international audience costs to have any effect, the UN has to go public. States do care about international opinion (within limits of course); military and economic aid often depends on it,

This often constrains UN involvement.

⁵² Pakistan insisted that talking about the current cease-fire alone rather than the wider context was unbalanced as the status quo favored India.

⁵³ UN Security Council Document S/6651, 3 September 1965, 7.

presumably even more so now than during the Cold War. But the UN has been very cautious about condemning states for violating the cease-fires it monitors. When major violations do break out, the international organization usually condemns the continued fighting or deplors both sides and calls for a new cease-fire. Throughout the Cold War, the UN was of course constrained by the permanent members of the Security Council and was often not free to condemn violations of the cease-fire. But on top of this constraint there seems to have developed an organizational reluctance to do or say anything that will jeopardize “impartiality.” This unfortunately undermines the organization’s ability to use the spotlight of international attention to help maintain peace. The UN often seems to be in the position of a watch dog who fears that barking might offend the robber (or the robber’s patrons). Ironically, in the India-Pakistan case, reluctance to condemn Pakistan led India to conclude the UN could not be relied upon in the conflict so impartiality was compromised in any case. The tension between credibility and impartiality continues to create dilemmas for UN peacekeeping.⁵⁴

Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP were quite effective in mediating, restoring local cease-fires and generally keeping tense situations from spiraling out of control. In neither case, however, could unarmed monitors prevent or deter deliberate decisions to attack. Observers could do nothing but watch Israel’s preemptive attack in 1967. Nor could they prevent (though they might have condemned) Pakistan’s instigation of guerilla war across the cease-fire line in Kashmir. And while both missions are in place to this day, they are largely inactive as neither

⁵⁴ On this dilemma see, Roberts, “The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping.” Lise Howard suggests that under Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali the UN became less reluctant to condemn belligerents. The problem persists to some degree, however. For a recent example in Angola see

Israel nor India cooperates with the missions. Even without full Indian cooperation, however, UNMOGIP is given credit for stabilizing the cease-fire (known as the “line of control” after 1971) in Kashmir.⁵⁵

In Korea, one clearly cannot give the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee⁵⁶ primary credit for preventing the resumption of war on the peninsula, though it may have helped stabilize the cease-fire to some extent. Nuclear deterrence makes the case overdetermined. The case of El Salvador and Honduras after the so-called Football War in 1969 provides a better glimpse into the empirical effects of monitoring. Thirty-three military observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) were sent to monitor the cease-fire that ended the war and El Salvador’s withdrawal to the status quo ante bellum. OAS policy was to pull the observers out as quickly as possible once things settled down, and all but two were pulled out within a six months.⁵⁷ Clashes broke out again however and the observers were sent back in. They again pulled out

[Page Fortna and Steven Stedman [Angola chapter, Implementation Project, forthcoming].

⁵⁵ UNMOGIP’s investigations and reports have “a dampening effect” on any incident that starts. Gen. (ret.) Jehangir Karamat of the Pakistan Army. Presentation at CISAC, Stanford University, May 19, 1999.

⁵⁶ The Committee’s monitoring effort consisted of observers from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia operating in twenty teams of at least four observers. *Agreement Between The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, On The One Hand, And The Supreme Commander Of The Korean People’s Army And The Commander Of The Chinese People’s Volunteers, On The Other Hand, Concerning A Military Armistice In Korea*, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953. The Korean armistice was also monitored by joint observation teams made up of the belligerents themselves.

⁵⁷ The OAS Secretary General, Galo Plaza had been involved in UN peacekeeping in Lebanon and Cyprus and was determined to avoid getting “locked in” and having peacekeepers stay for years. He insisted, “the parties themselves must take over full responsibility.” Quoted in Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*.

quickly – despite a request by the belligerents that it continue, the mission was terminated by December 1971. Serious fighting erupted again in 1976 and observers were deployed once more.⁵⁸ This time the OAS consented to leave some of them there until the dispute was eventually sent to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. In the Football War case we see both the selection effect (observers are sent in when only things get bad), and the stabilizing effect of monitors when they are present.

The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), consisting of four hundred military observers, was sent to supervise the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. When the cease-fire went into effect troops were in some places no more than 10 meters apart and there were several serious skirmishes in the first months of the cease-fire.⁵⁹ UNIIMOG is credited with keeping these incidents from escalating out of control and with helping to keep peace until Iraq's more pressing security concerns in the Gulf War prompted reconciliation with Iran in January 1991.

At the end of the Gulf War, the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was deployed as a monitoring mission in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) created along the Iraq-Kuwait border. In the ongoing dispute between the UN and Iraq, this mission was converted by 1994 into an armed peacekeeping mission able to take “physical action” to prevent violations of the DMZ

⁵⁸ Mary Jeanne Reid Martz, *The Central American Soccer War: Historical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978).

⁵⁹ Brian D. Smith, “United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group,” in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp.237-257. See also UN, *The Blue Helmets*.

through the addition of an infantry battalion.⁶⁰ This is an unusual case in that, having sanctioned the war against Iraq, the UN could not claim impartiality as observers. Assessment of the effectiveness of this as a peacekeeping action is further blurred by the ongoing “enforcement” action of the United States.⁶¹

Having reviewed the various monitoring missions undertaken between 1948 and 1991, what can we conclude about their effectiveness? Monitoring by the international community appears to play a limited but important role. Of course small numbers of unarmed observers have no hope of physically deterring deliberate aggression. Whether the spotlight of international attention plays a significant deterrent role is difficult to say. Deterrence success is notoriously difficult to evaluate empirically. UN monitors did not deter the Israeli offensive in the Negev in 1948, but Pakistan seems to have been reluctant to launch an overt invasion while UN personnel watched.

Monitoring has a much clearer effect as a means of stabilizing volatile cease-fire lines and preventing accidental escalation while belligerents attempt to negotiate. In the Middle East negotiations never got off the ground, in South Asia they eventually broke down and in both cases war resumed. Once another war has erupted, the credibility of monitors is strained and their effectiveness is markedly reduced. After the Football War and the Iran-Iraq War political settlements were eventually worked out. Monitors have no direct effect on the negotiation

⁶⁰ UN, *The Blue Helmets*.

⁶¹ From the US perspective, presumably, continued air strikes are helping to keep the peace. From Iraq’s perspective the US continually violates the cease-fire and there is therefore no peace to keep.

process, other than helping to prevent tension that can undermine the atmosphere necessary for talks. Observers are most effective as referees providing a channel for allegations, investigating incidents and mediating local cease-fires to help adversaries avoid spirals of incidents and escalations that might otherwise lead back to war.

The third category in Table 4 shows the armed peacekeeping operations undertaken during the Cold War.⁶² The first two are Middle East cases in which great power involvement and/or the threat of direct superpower involvement raised the stakes of peacemaking and peacekeeping considerably. As mentioned above, the practice of sending large numbers of armed soldiers under the auspices of the international community as a buffer to keep peace was developed to allow the United Kingdom and France to withdraw after the Suez crisis, and to oversee Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) is a classic case of the limits of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operates with the consent of the parties involved. So in 1967, when Nasser asked the UNEF to leave, the operation had to withdraw, and Israel launched a preemptive attack. It is important to note that Nasser could only get rid of the UN force unilaterally because Israel had never been willing to accept UNEF on its own territory. The buffer force had therefore been deployed only on Egyptian soil. Had Israel accepted UNEF either in 1956 or in 1967 when Egypt asked it to leave, the "course of history could have been different."⁶³ As it was, once Egypt revoked consent, UNEF was powerless to prevent this war.

⁶² Because of the multinational nature of the Sinai and Yom Kippur wars, and because there were two cease-fires in the Turco-Cypriot war and in the Israeli-Syrian fighting in Lebanon, the four cases here yield nine cease-fire dyads with armed peacekeeping in the dataset used for the previous tables.

⁶³ Secretary General U Thant, quoted in Sydney D Bailey, *Four Arab-Israeli Wars and*

Agreeing to peacekeeping ties belligerents' hands, but they retain the ability ultimately to untie the knot.

UNEF also clearly shows the effects of peacekeeping, however. First, the fact that Nasser felt it necessary to ask the mission to leave indicates that it was a constraint. Nasser withdrew consent for UNEF in part for political reasons, to respond to accusations within the Arab world that he needed UN protection from Israel. But he was well aware as tensions mounted toward war that should he desire to fight Israel, the UN peacekeepers presented a significant obstacle. Whether Egypt intended to strike Israel unprovoked or only in response to an offensive by Israel against Syria (the Soviet Union had mistakenly reported that Israel was amassing troops on the Syrian border), Israel took the move as a signal of impending attack.⁶⁴ The UNEF case thus suggests that peacekeeping was both a real constraint against attack and an important signal of intentions.

Second, and more powerfully, comparisons across time and across space show UNEF's effects on peace. Across time, we can examine the Israeli-Egyptian border before, during, and after UNEF's deployment. The pattern of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors was largely that of infiltration into Israel (at first often by farmers separated from their land by the cease-fire lines, and later by *fedayeen* (guerillas) and reprisals by Israel in return. The Egyptian-Israeli front had been volatile before 1956, but was largely quiet while the UNEF buffer force

the Peace Process (London: MacMillan, 1990).

⁶⁴ Up to this point, Israel had viewed aggressive posturing in Egypt as merely political maneuvering Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, Third ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

was there. After its departure and the 1967 war, clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces escalated back to the level of full-scale warfare in the War of Attrition in 1970.

Comparing the Israeli-Egyptian front while UNEF was deployed to the Israeli-Syrian and Israel-Jordanian fronts where no peacekeepers were present we also see a large difference. “There was a marked contrast between the quiet along the Egyptian border and the confrontation situation in other sectors.”⁶⁵ There was a higher concentration of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, making this front more problematic, but the difference also reflects the effect of UNEF’s role as a buffer force, in this case with authorization to apprehend infiltrators crossing from Egypt into Israel.

No armed peacekeepers were in place in the Middle East when the 1973 war broke out, though it is debatable whether they would have been able to prevent the deliberate Egyptian and Syrian attack. They would presumably have made the surprise attack on Yom Kippur more difficult, however. After the Yom Kippur war armed peacekeepers were deployed both in the Sinai (UNEF II) and in the Golan Heights as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces. UNEF II not only helped maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, it also allowed the peace process that eventually led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.⁶⁶ This is an important counter example to the argument made about UNFICYP in Cyprus, that by maintaining a cease-fire and keeping the costs of conflict low, peacekeepers can hinder peace processes. It is hard to

⁶⁵ UN, *The Blue Helmets*.

⁶⁶ A non-UN force, the Multinational Force and Observers took over peacekeeping after the Peace Treaty was signed. Opposition from Arab states and the Soviets to the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace process precluded any continued UN peacekeeping role.

imagine Sadat's visit to Jerusalem or the Camp David negotiations occurring while serious clashes took place along the Egyptian-Israeli front.

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployed in the Golan Heights after the 1973 war was, like UNEF, a classic buffer or interpositional force stationed in a demilitarized zone separating the two sides.⁶⁷ In the dataset used in Tables 1-3, the UNDOF mission is coded as a failure with peace lasting eight and a half years because Israel and Syria fought again in Lebanon in 1982. However, peace has lasted remarkably well in the Golan where the peacekeepers are deployed. The fact that these two adversaries did not fight over this most contested strategic piece of territory even while they were fighting each other in Lebanon (nor when Israel annexed the Golan, extending Israeli jurisdiction and administration to the territory in 1981) is strong testament to UNDOF's peace keeping effects.

The final two cases of armed peacekeeping listed in Table 4 are complicated. Both involve interstate wars that were fought in the context of civil wars. UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus in 1964 to keep peace between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after an eruption of fighting over attempts to change the power-sharing constitution. While the UN force was sent in part to forestall unilateral action by Turkey (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain each held the right to intervene militarily if the three of them together could not guarantee peace and security on the island), the force was designed to maintain a cease-fire in a civil war. It was in no position to

⁶⁷ Israel, previously opposed to strong peacekeeping forces, pushed for a large force of at least 3,000 troops. Syria, on the other hand, was concerned about infringements on its sovereignty, and wanted a non-military operation of only a few hundred monitors. They settled on 1,250 UN troops. The issue was touchy enough politically that even the name of the operation was an issue, with both "observer" and "force" in the title as a compromise. Henry

prevent military action by Turkey in 1974 after a coup inspired by Greece against the Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios. A very brief cease-fire, lasting only two weeks in early August, in this “interstate” war between Turkey and Cyprus is included in the cease-fires dataset used in the statistical analyses above. But neither this cease-fire nor its breakdown had much to do with UNFICYP. The second round of fighting ended on August 16, 1974. Since then, while there has been no resolution to the conflict, there has been a remarkably low level of violence – with fewer than a handful of politically motivated deaths in the last 25 years – and no further fighting by outside powers. Most observers believe that removal of UNFICYP would immediately lead to renewed communal violence and hence to interstate war over Cyprus.

The complicated history of the civil war in Lebanon and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is beyond the scope of this paper, but one cannot claim much success for the mission, except perhaps on humanitarian grounds. UNIFIL never fulfilled its (arguably impossible) mandate of restoring Lebanese governmental authority in 1978,⁶⁸ and it could do nothing more than count the tanks rolling by when Israel invaded in 1982. But as in the Cyprus case, the short-lived cease-fire for which peacekeeping is penalized in data analysis had little to do with UNIFIL.

How then do we evaluate the effects of armed peacekeeping? As with monitoring, the UNIFIL and UNFICYP experiences indicate that forces sent to keep peace at an earlier point, and

Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982).

⁶⁸ UNIFIL did oversee Israel’s withdrawal in 1979 (another part of its mandate) although Israel did not leave entirely and handed territory in southern Lebanon not to UNIFIL but to the “de facto forces” which quickly embroiled the UN further in the civil war.

in these cases in a different kind of war, have been ineffective. Missions sent to keep peace or restore order in civil conflicts could not prevent outside states from invading. But the record of UNEF and UNDOF show the positive effect armed peacekeepers have in maintaining peace. Even in the breach, when Nasser revoked consent for UNEF, we can see a glimmer of its potential to constrain attack. In comparisons before, during, and after UNEF's deployment, and by comparing stability along the various fronts while UNEF was in the Sinai, we see the stabilizing effects of peacekeeping effects more clearly. UNDOF's success in the Golan, despite the ongoing and extreme acrimony between Israel and Syria, is also testament to the value of an interpositional force. UNEF II and UNDOF indicate respectively that peacekeeping can be effective in creating stable conditions in which political resolution can take place, and in helping deadly enemies who cannot resolve their differences nonetheless to avoid a hot war.

Conclusion

Lightly or unarmed peacekeepers cannot prevent determined aggression of course. There is some evidence however that peacekeepers raise the cost of an attack, if only at the margins. Reluctance to condemn aggression (and thus lose the ability to mediate) has limited the UN's use of the spotlight of international attention. There is much stronger evidence that peacekeeping helps prevent accidental war. Peacekeepers' investigations take decision-makers off the hook when incidents and provocations occur, while local mediation in clashes and velitations have a clear stabilizing effect. Simply by separating forces, interpositional peacekeeping operations such as UNDOF and UNEF can prevent such incidents in the first place.

It is clear from the statistical analysis and even more so from the qualitative case comparison that selection bias drives the puzzling finding that peace fails more frequently when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. Examination of the cases reveals that, except in instances of extremely lopsided victory where the chance of renewed warfare is minuscule, the absence of peacekeeping is associated with very unstable peace. Given the degree of difficulty involved, cases with monitors fare somewhat better. By investigating and referring incidents, international monitors have helped deadly adversaries maintain tense cease-fires for long periods. Monitoring has certainly experienced some failures, and once war has resumed, the credibility and cooperation on which such missions depend falls away. In many cases, however, monitors have helped to keep a lid on conflict while negotiations could proceed. Where UN forces were sent to make or keep peace in civil wars they were not surprisingly unable to prevent international interventions (by Turkey in Cyprus and Israel in Lebanon). However, the two armed operations sent to keep peace along an interstate border have been enormously successful, helping Israel and Syria to avoid war despite their unresolved and bitter disputes, and better yet, allowing Egypt and Israel enough stability to pursue a true peace agreement.

Peacekeeping is clearly not a panacea, but it effectively helps belligerents who would otherwise have a very difficult time maintaining their cease-fire to avoid war. Clearly we should not throw the “baby” out with the bathwater. Whether the bathwater of non-traditional peacekeeping should go remains to be seen. The new wave of peacekeeping has yet to be systematically analyzed. As more time elapses, better data is collected on civil wars, and unfortunately has more cases of war occur, it will become possible to compare peacekeeping in

civil conflicts with cases in which the international community has not gotten involved. The study of traditional peacekeeping presented here suggests, however, that such analysis must take into account the selection effects involved. An accurate assessment of peacekeeping's empirical effects must take into consideration differences in the "degree of difficulty" involved. This in turn requires a better understanding of why peace sometimes lasts and sometimes fails after civil war.⁶⁹

Maintaining peace in the aftermath of war may be the most difficult problem of international cooperation there is. Deadly enemies have strong incentives to take advantage of each other, and every reason not to trust each other. Accidents, incidents and skirmishes can quickly spiral out of control. The international community can help, however, by providing neutral peacekeepers to raise the cost of attack at the margins, to separate troops, to referee and investigate and to mediate. A comparison of cases that takes selection effects into account shows these to be effective tools at the international community's disposal.

⁶⁹ A recent conference on durable settlements after civil wars, IGCC, University of California, San Diego, May 7-8, 1999 makes a promising start in this direction. See also B. Blechman and others, "Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace: Final Report," (Washington DC: DFI International, 1997) for an attempt to quantify the "degree of difficulty" in transitions to peace.

Appendix: Measurement and Model Details for Quantitative Analysis

Variable names in SMALL CAPS correspond to variable names in the Cease-Fires Dataset. The dataset is available upon request from the author.

Principal Variables:

Dependent variable = duration of PEACE, measured in months from the date of the cease-fire until the outbreak of another war between the same two belligerents, or until 1997 if peace has lasted to date (in which case the observation is considered censored at that point).⁷⁰ Original data adapted from Correlates of War (COW).

Peacekeeping (PKDUM) is a dummy variable coded 1 if a peacekeeping operation, either monitoring or armed peacekeeping, was deployed as part of the cease-fire or was already present. Peacekeeping operations include both UN, regional organization, and ad hoc missions.

Monitors (MONERS) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the peacekeeping operation was an unarmed monitoring mission.

PK Forces (PKERS) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the peacekeeping operation was an armed peacekeeping mission.

Control Variables:

Decisiveness of victory is coded with two variables: One (TIE) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the war ended in a tie, 0 if it ended with a victory for one side. Data is from COW and Stam.⁷¹ The other (DPOPDIF) is a measure of the difference in battle deaths calculates as: $(a's\ deaths/a's\ population) - (b's\ deaths/b's\ population)$ where a is the winner, or in a tie, the side with the lowest battle deaths. Battle death data is from COW with missing data filled in from Clodfelter.⁷²

Cost (DEATHS) is measured as total battle deaths (in 10,000s).

Contiguous (CONTIG) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the states in the dyad are contiguous or

⁷⁰ In none of the cases censored in 1997 has war resumed in the meantime.

⁷¹ Allan C. Stam, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

⁷² Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (McFarland, 1992).

separated by less than 200 miles of water.

History of conflict before the war (HISTORY) is the number of militarized interstate disputes between the states divided by years since both states were members of the interstate system, at the time the war broke out. Data is from the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (1994).

Stakes (STAKES) measures what the states stood to lose in the war. Values threatened are coded:

- 1 = influence in the international or regional system
- 2 = political system
- 3 = territorial integrity
- 4 = grave damage
- 5 = existence

This coding is adapted from Brecher and Wilkenfeld's International Crisis Behavior Dataset and their coding of the "gravity of the highest value threatened."⁷³

In models 3 and 4 cases in which the United States or the Soviet Union was a belligerent, are dropped to control of superpower belligerency (SUP_BEL).

The regressions reported in Table 3 are censored Weibull regressions run in Stata 6.0. Cases were clustered by conflict (all of the Arab-Israeli cases form a cluster, for example) to account for autocorrelation. Robust standard errors (RSE) are reported (calculated in Stata using Huber's method).

⁷³ Following Gelpi I have switched the order from the ICB dataset so that threats to influence are considered less serious than threats to the political system. Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 2 (1997) pp.339-360.

Table 1. Peacekeeping and the Resumption of War

	War Resumes		
Peacekeeping	No	Yes	Total
No	11 84.6%	2 15.4%	13
Yes	16 47.1%	18 52.9%	34
Total	27 57.5%	20 42.5.0%	47

$$\chi^2 = 5.3 \quad \Pr(\chi^2) = .02$$

Table 2. Peacekeeping and the Resumption of War, by Peacekeeping Type

	War Resumes		
Peacekeeping	No	Yes	Total
No	11 84.6%	2 15.4%	13
Unarmed Monitoring	11 44.0%	14 56.0%	25
Armed Peacekeeping Forces	5 55.6%	4 44.4%	9
Total	27 57.5%	20 42.5%	47

$$\chi^2 = 5.8 \quad \Pr(\chi^2) = .06$$

Table 3. Selection Effects in Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace: Controlling for “Baseline” Factors

Censored Weibull regressions on the duration of peace, cases clustered by conflict:

Variable	No Controls				With Controls*			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef. (RSE)	p> z	Coef. (RSE)	p> z	Coef. (RSE)	p> z	Coef. (RSE)	p> z
Peacekeeping	-3.03 (1.29)	.019			-0.08 (1.00)	.933		
Monitors			-3.14 (1.35)	.107			0.61 (.788)	.442
PK Forces			-2.66 (1.64)	.020			-0.55 (1.23)	.655
tie					-1.96 (1.15)	.089	-2.31 (1.47)	.116
diff in battle deaths/pop					-1.23 (0.07)	.000	-1.32 (0.14)	.000
cost (total deaths)					0.21 (0.04)	.000	0.22 (0.04)	.000
contiguous					-0.95 (0.89)	.287	-1.13 (1.21)	.352
history of conflict					-2.42 (1.06)	.023	-2.85 (0.71)	.000
stakes					-0.20 (0.25)	.419	-0.44 (0.38)	.252
constant	9.16 (1.57)	.000	9.15 (1.59)	.000	10.26 (1.92)	.000	11.59 (2.97)	.000
N	47		47		37		37	

* Superpower belligerent cases are omitted.

RSE = robust standard error

See Appendix for measurement details.

Table 4. The Cases

	War & end date	mission	war resumes?
No Peace- keeping	Russo-Hungarian 1956		no
	Sino-Indian 1962		incidents
	Vietnam 1973(US) 1975(No-So)		no
	Ethiopia-Somalia 1978		clashes, low level fighting until
	Uganda-Tanzania 1979		no
	Sino-Vietnamese 1979		clashes, full scale war in 1985
	Falklands 1982		no
	Sino-Vietnamese 1987		no
Unarmed Monitors	Palestine 1948	UNTSO	yes, in 3 months
	Palestine 1949	UNTSO	yes, in 1956 (Israel & Egypt) in 1967 (Israel - Syria & Jordan)
	First Kashmir 1949	UNMOGIP	yes, in 1965
	Korea 1953	Neutral Nations	no
	Second Kashmir 1965	UNMOGIP UNIPOM	yes, in 1971
	Six Day 1967	UNTSO	yes, in 1970 (Israel-Egypt) in 1973 (Israel-Syria)
	War of Attrition (Isr.-Egy) 1970	UNTSO	yes, in 1973
	Football (El Salv.-Hond.) 1969	OAS observers	sporadic clashes
	Bangladesh 1971	UNMOGIP	no
	Iran-Iraq 1988	UNIIMOG	no
	Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait) 1991	UNIKOM*	between Iraq & Kuwait, no ongoing US airstrikes
Armed Peace- Keeping Forces	Sinai 1956	UNEF I	yes, in 1967 (Israel-Egypt) no (UK & France)
	Yom Kippur 1973	UNEF II UNDOF	no (Israel-Egypt); Israel & Syria fight in Lebanon, not in Golan.

Turco-Cypriot 1974	UNFICYP	cease-fire fails in 2 weeks, then peace holds
Israel-Syria (in Lebanon) 1982	UNIFIL	cease-fire holds 1 month not UNIFIL related, however.

* UNIKOM became an armed peacekeeping force in 1993.