Lecture # 7. Collective security in the 1930s and 1990s.

Outline

  1. Map quiz.
  2. The post-WWI settlement.
  3. Collective security under the League of Nations.
  4. NATO enlargement debate.

Lecture

  1. Announcements.
    1. Map quiz.
    2. Read final class roll.
    3. Essay # 1 handout and discussion.
  2. The aftermath of World War I & the postwar settlement.
    1. The aftermath.
      1. Revolutions in Germany, Russia, & Turkey.
      2. Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
      3. More die of disease and civil war in years after the war — brought by war conditions —than died in the war itself.
    2. Postwar settlement.
      1. Armistice signed Nov 11, 1918.
      2. Treaty of Versailles, 1919.
        1. Chief player was U.S. Pres. Woodrow Wilson.
          1. Settlement guided by Wilson’s 14 Points (Jan 1918), calling for self-determination, peaceful resolution of disputes, international rule of law.
        2. Concessions by Germany.
          1. Enormous reparations debts to victors ($33 billion).
          2. All but token armed forces banned.
          3. Territorial concessions to France, Poland, etc.
        3. Principle of self-determination was implemented only halfway, leaving intact the French and British Empires (even adding to them in Mideast), while breaking up Austro-Hungarian Empire.
      3. League of Nations.
  3. Collective security under the League of Nations.
    1. Collective security.
      1. Definition:
        1. A liberal alternative to balance of power, based on the rule of law & international institutions.
        2. Embodies the (liberal) belief that "force can be tamed by law, just as it is at the domestic level" (Nye, 75). I.e., anarchy in international politics doesn’t impose any more constraints than we encounter at home.
      2. Distinct from the balance of power.
        1. BoPÞ strongest state; CSÞ aggressive state.
        2. BoPÞ alliances in advance of aggression; CSÞ alliances only after aggression revealed.
        3. BoPÞ those threatened by most powerful state should balance; CSÞ all members of the system are mandated to act vs. the aggressor.
      3. Operation:
        1. Submit disputes to arbitration.
        2. Outlaws war begun outside of League rules, as subject itself to punishment by all League members. Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 outlaws war in general.
        3. Like the Emory Honor Code!!! (Defines sin of omission as well as of commission.)
        4. But no enforcement: each state decided for itself whether to comply.
        5. Would you comply with the Honor Code under these circumstances?
    2. Problems.
      1. U.S. Senate rejected the treaty & US did not participate.
      2. Communist Russia a non-participant.
      3. French pressure for tougher line against Germany, continuing reparations payments resulting in in economic collapse and massive inflation in Germany, French occupation of Ruhr industrial region, political upheaval in Germany.
      4. Britain, on other hand, sought to reintegrate Germany. Finally in 1925, Germany allowed into League of Nations.
    3. The 1930s.
      1. Sept 1931, Japan stages Manchurian incident and seizes Manchuria. Result of growth of Japanese power and desire for colonies like other great powers, plus the increasing dominance of military in Japanese decision-making. After much delay, the League of Nations condemns but does not sanction Japan otherwise; Japan withdraws.
      2. Hitler becomes German Chancellor in 1933, elected into office in a democratic election (with plenty of paramilitary action by the brownshirts).
      3. March 1935, Hitler renounces Versailles constraints on German armed forces.
      4. October 1935, Italy invades Ethiopia. League of Nations economically sanctions Italy, but only partially. (E.g., Britain doesn’t close off Suez Canal, and no embargo on steel & oil.) Britain and France wanted to keep Italy available for an alliance against Hitler.
      5. March 1936, Hitler remilitarizes the Rhineland. Rhetoric about revisions of Versailles. BUCKPASS.
      6. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
      7. 1938, Hitler takes over Austria in the "Anschluss."
      8. September 1938, Munich Crisis, Germany seizes Sudetenland. BUCKPASS. "Peace in our time."
      9. March 1939, Germany invades rest of Czechoslovakia.
      10. August 1939, Germany and USSR sign nonaggression pact and agree to divide up Poland and other Eastern European states. BANDWAGON.
      11. Sept 1939, Germany invades Poland. Fr & Britain declare war.
      12. June 1941, Germany invades USSR, bringing USSR into war.
      13. July 1941, US full oil embargo on Japan re: China invasion.
      14. Dec 7, 1941: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor & then Hitler declares war as well on US.
  4. Lessons learned (from collective security efforts in 1930s).
    1. Was the tough line against Germany in 1919 prudent?
    2. Why didn’t the League of Nations succeed in deterring/punishing violations?
    3. What lessons does the League’s experience provide for collective security efforts after World War II and today?
  5. NATO enlargement.
    1. Background.
      1. NATO – North Atlanta Treaty Organization.
      2. 1998, U.S. Senate ratified a treaty extending NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
      3. NATO:
        1. A mutual defense pact: "An attack on one shall be considered an attack on all."
        2. Requires unanimity before acting.
        3. Joint command, under supreme military leadership of a U.S. officer.
        4. Political chief is European by tradition.
        5. A collective security venture — at least in the absence of a Soviet threat — given the large number of member states and their disparate interests.
    2. Reasons FOR.
      1. State: Lessens external threat by adding more members & boosting deterrence power of NATO.
      2. State: Stabilizes democracy in Central Europe, lessening internal threat.
      3. State: Strengthens military resources and power of NATO by 200,000 troops.
      4. State: Erases "iron curtain" dividing line.
      5. State: Russia is constructively engaged with NATO and has a voice in its growth, thus making it less threatened by NATO’s expansion of power.
      6. State: Previous accessions (of Greece, Turkey, Spain) strengthened the alliance and did not undermine its credibility.
      7. State: Costs of accession adjustments shouldn’t be more than $400 million, not to mention new gains for U.S. arms manufacturers.
      8. Odom: NATO is more likely to aid the cause of Russian liberals than conservatives!
      9. Odom: Spain accession cost NATO nothing.
      10. Odom: Potential for ethnic-based conflict is high without dampening force of NATO.
    3. Reasons AGAINST.
      1. Security dilemma: NATO’s growth in power should threaten non-members like Russia.
      2. Hollow alliance: U.S. and other states have few interests in Central Europe and will not be willing to risk war for its security.
      3. Kennan: "A fateful error," would strengthen nationalistic and anti-West opposition in Russia, would undermine prospects for Russian democracy, & would threaten existing cooperation with Russia on nuclear arms limits and current foreign policy issues.
      4. Baker, Nunn, Scowcroft, and Frye: "A bad idea whose time has come." Keep NATO the way it was, and link NATO expansion to EU membership. (Would bootstrap the necessary national interest, in terms of economic interdependence, and enhance credibility of the alliance. Would permit stabilization of nuclear arms limits with Russia.
      5. Baker, Nunn, Scowcroft, and Frye: Invoke the "lesson" of the League’s experience, i.e., that should go easy on a defeated rival.
    4. Puzzle : Why has NATO persisted, even expanded, in the absence of the Soviet threat?
      1. Contrast with balance of power.
      2. What does your answer say about the prospects for collective security?