Under what conditions will a state repress its citizens?  Scholars have in large part turned to institutions to answer this question.  However, we cannot evaluate how institutions affect human rights practices if we do not understand what would happen in the absence of these institutions.  Unfortunately, the literature that examines the micro-foundations of rights violations is conflicted; scholars agree dissent leads to repression, and repression affects dissent, yet there is no consensus as to exactly how.

Nevertheless, theories of repression do share common assumptions: (1) dissent and repression are causally interrelated; (2) states and groups are in conflict over some policy or good; and (3) authorities repress in order to remain in office.  I develop a game theoretic model based on these first principles to flesh out the relationship between rights violations and dissent.  The model accounts for most of the literature’s conflicting findings in a strategically interdependent model.  It also yields novel predictions, particularly over the dissident groups strategic choices.  Finally, it suggests there is an important theoretical difference between the likelihood of repression or dissent and the levels of these behaviors that has not previously been explored.

Once I establish a baseline understanding of the conflict process of rights violations, I can consider how international and domestic judicial institutions might alter these behaviors.  Most judicial scholars believe a sufficiently independent judiciary increases the executive’s costs for violating rights.  However, we observe cases in which independent courts do not rule against violations and others in which vulnerable courts successfully curb executive action.  To examine when courts can constrain in practice, I extend the baseline model and unpack two ideas that are usually conflated in studies of courts and human rights: autonomy and power.  According to the results of the model, I argue that autonomy is neither necessary nor sufficient to curb human rights violations.  Nonindependent institutions will rule against the executive and even garner compliance with the ruling when they have expectations of external enforcement, while autonomous institutions without such power will allow repression with no sanction.  Additionally, even powerful courts will be less effective when conflict conditions with the dissident group necessitate repression.

I test the empirical results of both formal models in three quantitative chapters.  I use human rights events data aggregated by month from 1990 to 2004 to measure the level as well as the likelihood of dissent and repression for all states.  I first test the implications of the baseline model alone.  In the second empirical chapter, I examine the effects of domestic judiciaries on human rights outcomes as predicted in the extended model.  Finally, I assess the results of this model as they apply to international human rights courts and treaty monitoring bodies.