I am a member of the economics department at Emory University. To contact me you can write to:
cnoussa@emory.edu
or to:
Department of EconomicsMy research involves the use of experimental methods to address economic research questions. For a list of my research papers, you can view my CV.
Some of my as yet unpublished working papers are available here:
The paper A Market with Frictions in the Matching Process: an Experimental Study, with Timothy Cason, studies what happens in a market when the matching process between buyers and sellers contains a friction that can cause inefficiencies in trade.
The paper Equilibrium Selection in an Experimental Macroeconomy, with Vivian Lei, reports a laboratory macroeconomic experiment in which we study whether or when economies get stuck in poverty traps.
The paper The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, with Ernan Haruvy, shows that short selling possibilities reduce prices in labroratory asset markets.
The paper Futures Markets and Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets, with Steven Tucker, illustrates that the introduction of futures markets can induce asset prices to track fundamental values.
The paper Risk Aversion in the Present and Future , with Ping Wu, documents the result that people are more risk tolerant for gambles realized and paid in the future than in the present.
The paper Production, Trade, and Exchange Rates in Large Experimental Economies with Charles Plott and Raymond Riezman, reports the results from a study of a very complex experimental international economy.
The paper Efficient Mixing and Unpredictability in an Experimental Game with Marc Willinger, explores behavior in an asymmetric normal form game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
The paper Contracting Inside an Organization: An Experimental Study, with John Ledyard, Harley Thronson, Peter Ulrich, Giulio Varsi, and Paul Healy, describes and reports the results from an experiment designed to explore alternative procurement systems.
The paper Announcement, Observation and Honesty in the Voluntary Contributions Game, with Laurent Denant-Boemont and David Masclet, studies what happens to cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are posted publicly and when individuals announce their decisions in advance.
The paper The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps , with Monica Capra, Tomomi Tanaka, Colin Camerer, Lauren Munyan, Veronica Sovero, and Lisa Wang, considers the impact of different institutional structures on economic growth in laboratory economies.
The paper Public Observability of Decisions and Voluntary Contributions in a Multi-Period Context , with Steven Tucker, studies whether cooperation generated by requiring decisions to be made in public in front of other members of a group is durable.
The paper Individual Behavior and Beliefs in Pariumutual Betting Markets , with Frederic Koessler and Anthony Ziegelmeyer considers decisions and beliefs of betters and observers in an experimental betting market.
The paper Punishment. Counterpunishment, and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment , with Laurent Denant-Boemont and David Masclet, studies the effect of multiple opportunites to apply punishment on contributions and welfare in a voluntary contribution game.