Research Interests
Published Articles
Volden, Craig, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. “The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Modern Parliamentary Democracies”. American Journal of Political Science. 48(3) 521-537.
Carrubba, Clifford J. and Anand Singh. 2004. “A Decision- Theoretic Model of Public Opinion Formation: Guns, Butter, and European Common Defense.” American Journal of Political Science. 48(2) 218-231.
Carrubba, Clifford J. and Jim Rogers. 2003. “National Judicial
Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause.” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization. 19(2) 543-70.
Carrubba, Clifford J. 2002. “The European Court of Justice,
Democracy, and Enlargement.” European Union Politics. 4(1) 75-100.
Carrubba, Clifford J, and Craig Volden. 2001. “Explaining
Institutional Change in the European Union: What
Determines the Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers?” European Union Politics. 2(1) 5-30.
Carrubba, Clifford J. 2001. “The Electoral Connection in European
Union Politics.” Journal of Politics. 63(1) 141-58.
Carrubba, Clifford J, and Craig Volden. 2001. “Coalitional Politics and
Logrolling in Legislative Institutions.” American Journal of
Political Science. 44(2) 261-77.
Carrubba, Clifford J. 1997. “Net Financial Transfers in the
European Union: Who gets What and Why?” Journal of Politics.
59(2) 469-96.
Forthcoming Articles
Carrubba, Clifford J. "Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes". Journal of Politics. Forthcoming.
PDF
Abstract:
International regulatory regimes are increasingly important parts of interstate politics. As these regimes multiply, the question of what exactly governments are agreeing to is becoming increasingly important. Some scholars see the high levels of observed compliance with these regimes as a sign that they are transforming interstate relationships. Others argue that compliance rates are uninformative since governments will only choose a depth of agreement that is self-enforcing. This study demonstrates that even deep agreements with well developed, and seemingly effective, adjudicating mechanisms can suffer from severe enforcement problems. The relevance of this model for a real world deep agreement, the European Union, is demonstrated, and predictions that can determine if a regulatory regime suffers from enforcement problems are derived.
Carrubba, Clifford J., and Lacey Murrah. "Legal Integration and use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the Eruopean Union". International Organization. Forthcoming.
PDF
Abstract:
Scholars agree that the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in promoting European integration; however, no consensus has been reached as to why the system is used. Although many explanations have been posited, there has been no systematic comparative test among them to date. In this paper, we perform this test. We find evidence that transnational economic activity, public support for integration, monist or dualist tradition, judicial review and the public’s political awareness influence use of the preliminary ruling system.
Carrubba, Clifford J., and Richard Timpone. "Explaining Vote Switching Across First and Second Order Elections: Evidence from Europe". Comparative Political Studies. Forthcoming.
PDF
Abstract:
Across Western Democracies individuals frequently vote for different parties in different elections.
A variety of explanations have been proposed for this behavior. In the European context, scholars have focused on the idea that
individuals may vote for different parties because some elections are less important than others (i.e. are “second order”
elections). In the U.S. context scholars have focused on the possibility that individuals might vote for different parties
because they care about how the two chambers will affect policy outcomes. In this paper, we test among four alternative
motivations for vote switching, two predicated on the notion that individuals treat one of the elections as second order and two
predicated on the notion that individuals care about policy outcomes from both chambers. The tests are performed by analyzing
Euro-barometer survey data on individual voting behavior in European national and European Parliament (EP) elections. We find
support for all four motivations.
Working Papers
Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery, and Rebecca Schambach. "Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias, and Roll-Call
Vote Analysis"
PDF
Abstract:
Scholars agree that the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in promoting European integration; however, no consensus has been reached as to why the system is used. Although many explanations have been posited, there has been no systematic comparative test among them to date. In this paper, we perform this test. We find evidence that transnational economic activity, public support for integration, monist or dualist tradition, judicial review and the public’s political awareness influence use of the preliminary ruling system.
Carrubba, Clifford J., and Christopher Zorn. "Federal Preferences and State Government Influence in the U.S. Supreme Court"
PDF
Abstract:
An important tension -- arguably the key tension -- within any federal system is that which exists between the reach of national authority and the sovereignty of subnational bodies. And perhaps nowhere is that tension more strongly felt than in the judiciary, for two reasons. First, in many if not most instances it is the judicial branch which is called upon to adjudicate disputes arising out of that tension. Second, and more important, judicial decisions are often at the mercy of other institutions, both national and subnational, to ensure their implementation. These two facts suggest that courts within a federal system with their pronouncements ought carefully to consider the preferences of national and subnational actors should they wish to ensure compliance with their pronouncements.
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