The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between Public Opinion and Supreme Court Decision-making (with Micheal W. Giles and Richard L. Vining, Jr.)

The Journal of Politics, April 2008,  pages 293-306.

Abstract  There is wide scholarly agreement that the frequent replacement of justices has kept the Supreme Court generally attuned to public opinion.  Recent research indicates that, in addition to this indirect effect, Supreme Court justices respond directly to changes in public opinion.  We explore the two causal pathways suggested to link public opinion directly to the behavior of justices and the implications of the nature and strength of these linkages for current debates concerning Supreme Court tenure.   The recent increase in the stability of Court membership has raised questions about the continued efficacy of the replacement mechanism and renewed debates over mechanisms to limit judicial tenure.  Our analysis provides little that justices respond strategically to public opinion but provides partial support for the idea that justices' preferences shift in response to the same social forces that shape the opinions of the general public.  Our analysis offers preliminary evidence that--even in the absence of membership change--public opinion may provide a mechanism by which the preferences of the Court can be aligned with those of the public.

Partisan Regimes and the Search for Strategic Behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (with Susan Navarro Smelcer)

Abstract  Do judges in the United States Courts of Appeals behave strategically? Studies attempting to answer this question have yielded mixed and contradictory results.  The failure of extant work to provide clear evidence that supports or refutes strategic explanations makes it necessary to conduct a broader and more basic test.  We evaluate the hypothesis that minority status constrains Courts of Appeals judges when they cast votes in panels, hypothesizing that judges in the circuit minority will vote less ideologically than their counterparts in the circuit majority. We find that membership in the circuit minority imposes a significant constraint of judicial voting, although this effect varies according to case salience and panel type.  We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, minority judges vote less ideologically than their brethren in the circuit majority.

Earlier versions Presented at the 2007 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Chicago, IL, August 30-September 2, 2007) and the Sixty-Fourth Annual Midwest Political Science Association National Conference (Chicago, IL, April 20-23, 2006).

The Neglected Portions of Separation of Powers Interactions

Abstract  A call for SOP scholars to focus attention on previously neglected portions of Congress-Court interactions. I contend that scholars should devote increased attention to studying anticipatory decision-making by Congress and the substance and aftermath of legislation passed in response to Supreme Court decisions.

Presented at the Sixty-Fifth Annual Midwest Political Science Association National Conference (Chicago, IL, April 12-15, 2007).

Beginning at the Beginning:

The Decision to Legislate and the Separation of Powers

Abstract    A formal model of SOP interactions is employed to evaluate the conditions under which anticipation of negative treatment by the Supreme Court leads Congress to refrain from enacting legislation. The model's hypotheses are empirically tested using data from the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

PRESENTED at the Sixty-Sixth Annual Midwest Political Science Association National Conference (Chicago, IL, April 3-6, 2008).

Are `Overrides' Overrated?  The Effect of Legislation Passed in Response to the Constitutional Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract    I consider the aftermath of legislation passed in response to constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court to evaluate the assertion that Congress can "override" the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court through the passage of ordinary legislation.  I analyze the substance of responsive legislation to assess the extent to which it "undoes" the relevant Supreme Court ruling.  Finally, I assess the frequency with which responsive statutes are subjected to legal challenges in the federal courts and the decisions of the courts that review them.

Presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2008).